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STATE GOVERNMENT-THE ARKANSAS FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
ACT-PUBLIC OR PRIVATE RECORD: A SIMPLE DISTINCTION THREATENS
THE FUTURE OF OPEN GOVERNMENT IN ARKANSAS. PULASKI COUNTY V.
ARKANSAS DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, INC., 371 Ark. 217, 264 S.W.3d 465 (Ark.
Oct. 4, 2007).
I. INTRODUCTION
"Regnat Populus-The People Rule-is the motto of Arkansas. It
should ever remain inviolate."'
For advocates of open government, former Arkansas Supreme Court
Justice Jim Johnson's words are music to their ears and bring to mind Abra-
ham Lincoln's famous trilogy: "government of the people, by the people, for
the people." The statutory right of individuals to inspect the records or at-
tend the meetings of their federal, state, and local governments is arguably
the most effective check that citizens have on their elected officials and
government agencies.3 For example, the Arkansas Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA) allows access to government records and meetings;4 this pro-
vides Arkansans with the ability to monitor the management of their state
and local governments, to scrutinize their elected officials in the prudent
execution of their duties, and to ensure efficient spending of their tax dol-
lars.5
Long before public records laws, Thomas Jefferson recognized that
"[e]very government degenerates when trusted to the rulers of the people
alone. The people themselves, therefore, are its only safe depositories."6
Today, as in the early years of our republic, it is understood that an educated
and informed electorate is essential to our form of government and neces-
1. Republican Party of Ark. v. State, ex. rel. Hall, 240 Ark. 545, 549, 400 S.W.2d 660,
662 (1966).
2. Abraham Lincoln, United States President, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863).
3. Martin E. Halstuk & Charles N. Davis, The Public Interest Be Damned: Lower
Court Treatment of the Reporters Committee "Central Purpose" Reformulation, 54 ADMIN.
L. REv. 983, 984 (2002).
4. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 25-19-101 to -109 (LEXIS Repl. 2002 & Supp. 2007).
5. See id. § 25-19-102.
6. Eyler Robert Coates, Sr., Thomas Jefferson on Politics and Government (Dec. 21,
1995), http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/jefferson/quotations/jeffl350.htm (webpage is a collection
of over 2,700 of Thomas Jefferson's quotations compiled using Thomas Jefferson, Notes on
Virginia Q.XIV (1782), in 2 THE WRITNGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 207 (Lipscomb and Berg
eds., Memorial Edition, 1903-04)).
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sary for the continued public oversight of government functions.7 The Unit-
ed States Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he basic purpose of [the] FOIA
is to ensure an informed citizenry, vital to the functioning of a democratic
society, needed to check against corruption and to hold the governors ac-
countable to the governed."'
In June of 2007, the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette made a routine re-
quest under the Arkansas FOLA for the disclosure of a former Pulaski Coun-
ty official's e-mails. 9 In an attempt to satisfy that request, the county re-
leased some of the requested e-mails.'l The county's failure to release all of
the e-mails led the newspaper to file suit, alleging that the remaining e-mails
were public records subject to disclosure."' These events led to the Arkansas
Supreme Court's most recent interpretation of what constitutes a "public
record" under the Arkansas FOIA in Pulaski County v. Arkansas Democrat-
Gazette, Inc. 12
Although the court's ultimate decision to disclose the e-mails was cor-
rect, its failure to establish clear standards regarding both the presumption
created by section 25-19-103(5)(A) of the Arkansas Code" and the burden
required to rebut that presumption, results in a lack of guidance for the
state's trial courts and leads to the possibility of increased government abuse
in denying FOIA requests.14 The long-term effect of Pulaski County is un-
clear, but its potential impact is unsettling. If Arkansas courts interpret the
Pulaski County decision as creating a "personal" exemption to the FOIA,
the right of Arkansans to monitor the workings of their state and local gov-
ernments will be hindered forever because the cost of FOIA litigation will
increase, the disclosure of public records will be significantly delayed, and
the total number of successful FOIA requests will dramatically decrease.'
5
7. Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1, 17 (1974) (stating that
the purpose of the FOIA is to provide an informed public so that it may make intelligent
decisions regarding government functions); ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-102 (LEXIS Repl.
2002).
8. N.L.R.B. v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978).
9. Pulaski County v. Ark. Democrat-Gazette, Inc., 370 Ark. 435,437, 260 S.W.3d 718,
719 (2007) ("Pulaski County F).
10. Id., 260 S.W.3d at 719.
11. Id., 260 S.W.3d at 719-20.
12. The supreme court actually delivered five decisions in this case, but the court's
significant opinions are contained in only two of those decisions: Pulaski County I and Pu-
laski County v. Ark. Democrat-Gazette, Inc., 371 Ark. 217, --- S.W.3d --- (2007) ("Pulaski
County I'). Pulaski County I was delivered on July 20, 2007, and Pulaski County 1 on Oc-
tober 4, 2007.
13. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-103(5)(A) (LEXIS Supp. 2007) ("All records maintained
in public offices or by public employees within the scope of their employment shall be pre-
sumed to be public records.").
14. See infra Part IV.
15. See infra Part IV.A-B.
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This note begins by exploring the historical development of the Arkan-
sas FOIA."6 It then considers the present state of the FOIA, 7 and how Ar-
kansas courts have interpreted it over the last forty years. 8 Next, the note
focuses on the issues that public use of e-mail has created for the Arkansas
FOIA as well as the public records laws in several other states.19 After an
analysis of the Pulaski County decision, 2° the note concludes by discussing
the ongoing impact of the court's decision and considers the threat Pulaski
County poses to Arkansans' right to access and scrutinize their state and
local governments.2'
II. BACKGROUND
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution does not en-
compass a general right of access to government records and affairs.22 The
United States Supreme Court has, however, acknowledged "the paramount
public interest in a free flow of information to the people concerning public
officials. 23 Although no constitutional right of access to government
records or meetings exists,24 Congress and state legislatures have established
such a right through public access laws.25
This section briefly traces the historical development of the public
access law in Arkansas.26 It also discusses the current public access law in
Arkansas under the Arkansas FOIA, focusing primarily on access to public
records.27 Next, this section describes how Arkansas courts have interpreted
the Arkansas FOIA over the last forty years. 2' Finally, this section considers
the complicated relationship between e-mails created on government-owned
e-mail systems and states' open records laws.29
16. See infra Part IB.A.
17. See infra Part II.B.
18. See infra Part II.C.
19. See infra Part II.D.
20. See infra Part III.
21. See infra Part IV.
22. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 9 (1978).
23. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964).
24. Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGs L.J. 631, 636 (1975).
25. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C.S. § 552 (LexisNexis 2008); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 25-19-101 to -
109 (LEXIS Repl. 2002 & Supp. 2007).
26. See infra Part II.A.
27. See infra Part II.B.
28. See infra Part B.C.
29. See infra Part II.D.
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A. Historical Development of the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act
in Arkansas
The common law recognized a very limited right of public access to
government records in favor of "those seeking to vindicate the public inter-
est."3° Access was often denied, however, because the inspector's purpose
was based improperly on curiosity or commercial gain, or if the government
determined that disclosure would be detrimental to the public interest. 3' In
addition, the definition of a "public record" was limited to only those
records government agencies were legally required to hold.32 Unfortunately,
the common law did not create any right of access to governmental meet-
ings, allowing most government bodies to convene in complete secrecy
without any interference from the public.33
In the 1940s and 1950s, the Arkansas General Assembly tried to enact
laws that would require open meetings at the state and local levels of gov-
ernment, but their attempts proved relatively ineffective.-4 In 1966, the Ar-
kansas Supreme Court expanded the scope of the public's right to access
government records, and stated, "[I]f there be any rule of the English com-
mon law that denies the public the right of access to public records, it is
repugnant to the spirit of our democratic institutions., 35 Following the
court's decision in Republican Party of Arkansas v. State, ex. rel. Hall,36 the
Arkansas General Assembly enacted the Arkansas Freedom of Information
Act in 1967.37 In addition to the supreme court's expansion of the common
law right to access government records, several other factors contributed to
the enactment of the FOIA, including: (1) a campaign by Arkansas journal-
ists; (2) a Legislative Council study that examined public access laws in
other states; (3) Attorney General interpretations that undermined the open
meeting statutes that applied to cities, counties, and school districts; (4) sev-
eral controversial governmental meetings that were closed to the public; and
(5) the election of Governor Winthrop Rockefeller. 38 At his last press confe-
30. JOHN J. WATKINS & RICHARD J. PELTZ, THE ARKANSAS FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
ACT 1-2 (4th ed. 2004).
31. Id. at 2.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 4.
35. Republican Party of Ark. v. State, ex rel. Hall, 240 Ark. 545, 549, 400 S.W.2d 660,
662 (1966).
36. 240 Ark. 545,400 S.W.2d 660 (1966).
37. Laman v. McCord, 245 Ark. 401, 402, 432 S.W.2d 753, 754 (1968). The Act has
been amended on various occasions and is currently codified at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 25-19-
101 to -109 (LEXIS Repl. 2002 & Supp. 2007).
38. WATKINS & PELTZ, supra note 30, at 4.
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rence in office, Governor Rockefeller told reporters that he considered the
FOIA to be one of his greatest achievements as governor.
39
B. The Arkansas Freedom of Information Act
The Arkansas FOIA requires that "all public records... be open to in-
spection and copying by any citizen of the State of Arkansas," and man-
dates that "all meetings ... of the governing bodies... of the State of Ar-
kansas.. . supported wholly or in part by public funds or expending public
funds, shall be public meetings." ' The General Assembly clearly states the
purpose of the FOIA in section 25-19-102 of the Arkansas Code, which pro-
vides the following:
It is vital in a democratic society that public business be performed in an
open and public manner so that the electors shall be advised of the per-
formance of public officials and of the decisions that are reached in pub-
lic activity and in making public policy. Toward this end, this chapter is
adopted, making it possible for them or their representatives to learn and
to report fully the activities of their public officials.42
The legislature furthered its desire for liberal, public access to state and
local government by defining "public records" as:
writings, recorded sounds, films, tapes, electronic or computer-based in-
formation, or data compilations in any medium required by law to be
kept or otherwise kept and that constitute a record of the performance or
lack of performance of official functions that are or should be carried out
by a public official or employee, a governmental agency, or any other
agency wholly or partially supported by public funds or expending pub-
lic funds. All records maintained in public offices or by public employees
within the scope of their employment shall be presumed to be public
records.43
The final sentence of section 25-19-103(5)(A) makes the General As-
sembly's desire apparent by presuming that any records maintained in a
public office or by a public employee in the course of his employment are
public records.' The presumption is broad, but is only a presumption and
39. John J. Watkins, Access to Public Records under the Arkansas Freedom of Informa-
tion Act, 37 ARK. L. REv. 741, 757-58 (1984).
40. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-105(a)(1)(A) (LEXIS Supp. 2007).
41. Id. § 25-19-106(a) (LEXIS Supp. 2007).
42. Id. § 25-19-102 (LEXIS Repl. 2002).
43. Id. § 25-19-103(5)(A) (LEXIS Supp. 2007) (emphasis added).
44. WATKINS & PELTZ, supra note 30, at 86.
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may be rebutted by showing that "the records do not otherwise fall within
the definition found in the first sentence" of section 25-19-103(5)(A). 45
The FOIA mandates that all records "required by law to be kept" by
government officials or employees are subject to disclosure, but also in-
cludes those records "otherwise kept and that constitute a record of the per-
formance or lack of performance of official functions."' The "performance"
language narrows the scope of what constitutes a "public record" because it
requires that a document have some connection to the performance of "offi-
cial functions." '47 The term "official functions" makes no distinction between
governmental and proprietary functions.48 Therefore, both the "perfor-
mance" language and the term "official functions" further the General As-
sembly's intent that the "public business be performed in an open and public
manner" because, taken in combination, they require that a document specif-
ically relate to the administration of governmental affairs before being sub-
ject to disclosure.49
Although the last sentence appears to create such a presumption, pos-
session alone is not determinative of what constitutes a public record under
section 25-19-103(5)(A) of the Arkansas Code.5" If it were, personal records
would be subject to the FOIA.5" Section 25-19-103(5)(A), however, negates
the FOIA's applicability to personal items because it reaches only docu-
ments that are "required by law to be kept or otherwise kept and that consti-
tute a record of the performance or lack of performance of official func-
tions" and those maintained by public employees within their scope of em-
ployment.52 Thus, personal records necessarily fall outside the definition of
45. Op. Ark. Att'y Gen. No. 2005-095 (2005). For example, a document may be pre-
sumed to be a public record if it is found in a public office, but would not be subject to dis-
closure if the government agency could show that it was not "required by law to be kept or
[if] otherwise kept [that it does not] constitute a record of the performance or lack of perfor-
mance of official functions." See id. (quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-103(5)(A) (LEXIS
Supp. 2007)).
46. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-103(5)(A) (LEXIS Supp. 2007). The FOIA originally
applied only to "records which are required by some statute ...to be made and kept."
McMahan v. Bd. Trs. of the Univ. of Ark., 255 Ark. 108, 111,499 S.W,2d 56,58 (1973).
47. WATKINS & PELTZ, supra note 30, at 91, 93.
48. WATKINS & PELTz, supra note 30, at 91. This is the view of the Arkansas Supreme
Court as expressed in City of Fayetteville v. Edmark, where the court stated that "whether the
activity is 'proprietary' or 'governmental' in nature ... the government is involved in the
'public['s] business."' 304 Ark. 179, 187, 801 S.W.2d 275, 279 (1990) (quoting Watkins,
supra note 39, at 768).
49. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-102 (LEXIS Repl. 2002).
50. WATINS & PELTZ, supra note 30, at 86.
51. WATKINS & PELTZ, supra note 30, at 86.
52. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-103(5)(A) (LEXIS Supp. 2007). Professor Watkins
and Professor Peltz recommend that Arkansas courts adopt the reasoning of the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Wolfe v. Department of Health & Humans
Services, 711 F.2d 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1983), in order to protect the statutory protection of per-
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"public records" because the law does not require their retention; they are
unrelated to the performance of official functions, and they are not main-
tained by public employees within their scope of employment.53
Conversely, lack of actual possession will not preclude a document
from disclosure.' 4 Section 25-19-103(1)(A) of the Arkansas Code defines
"custodian" as "the person having administrative control of' a public
record.55 The idea of "administrative control" means that records will be
subject to the FOIA regardless of their physical location, as long as the
records are within an agency's control or constructive possession.56 The
Arkansas Supreme Court has designated possession or administrative con-
trol of a document as the initial factor to consider when determining whether
a document is a public record subject to disclosure.57
C. Judicial Interpretation of the FOIA
Through dozens of decisions, the Arkansas Supreme Court has devel-
oped specific rules of statutory interpretation for the Arkansas FOIA. This
section looks at these general rules of FOIA interpretation as the court has
developed them over the last forty years.58 It also discusses a rule of judicial
balancing adopted by the Arkansas Supreme Court to assist in FOIA inter-
pretation.59
1. General Rules of FOIA Construction
In 1968, the Arkansas Supreme Court had its first opportunity to interp-
ret the FOIA in Laman v. McCord.6' In that case, the question arose as to
whether the North Little Rock City Council could conduct closed meetings
sonal records. WATKINS & PELTZ, supra note 30, at 86. In that case, the court held that docu-
ments were not subject to the federal FOIA simply because they were located in the office of
a high-ranking agency official, instead the requirement is that a federal agency actually have
custody of records before subjecting them to disclosure under the federal FOIA. Wolfe, 711
F.2d at 1080 (citing Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 178 (1980)).
53. See id. § 25-19-103(5)(A).
54. City of Fayetteville v. Edmark, 304 Ark. 179, 186-87, 801 S.W.2d 275, 279 (1990);
see also Scott v. Smith, 292 Ark. 174, 175, 728 S.W.2d 515, 515 (1987) (rejecting physical
possession by agency counsel as determinative of a document's status as a public record).
55. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-103(1)(A) (LEXIS Supp. 2007).
56. WATKINS & PELTz, supra note 30, at 86.
57. Swaney v. Tilford, 320 Ark. 652, 655, 898 S.W.2d 462, 464-65 (1995).
58. See infra Part II.C.1.
59. See infra Part II.C.2.
60. 245 Ark. 401,432 S.W.2d 753 (1968).
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with the city attorney. 6' The supreme court affirmed the trial court's decision
that such a meeting violated the FOIA.62
Two major developments in FOIA jurisprudence resulted from Laman.
First, the court rejected the city's argument that the provisions of the FOIA
must be strictly construed, and in doing so developed the method by which
the FOIA was to be interpreted.63 The court stated the following:
Whether a statute should be construed narrowly or broadly depends upon
the interest with which the statute deals. As a rule, statutes enacted for
the public benefit are to be interpreted most favorably to the public ....
We have no hesitation in asserting our conviction that the Freedom of In-
formation Act was passed wholly in the public interest and is to be liber-
ally interpreted to the end that its praiseworthy purposes may be
achieved.
The language of the act is so clear, so positive, that there is hardly any
need for interpretation.
64
Second, the court addressed the city's argument that the attorney-client
privilege was an exception to the FOIA.65 The court rejected this argument
and articulated its rule that the FOIA's disclosure provisions are to be liber-
ally interpreted by implicitly requiring narrow construction of the FOIA
exceptions.' Later, in McCambridge v. City of Little Rock, 67 the court ex-
plained that the FOIA exceptions must be narrowly construed to "counter-
balance the self-protective instincts of the governmental bureaucracy. ,68
In Ragland v. Yeargan,69 the court explained that in order for a statute
to create a FOIA exception or exemption, the language of the statute must
be explicit and specific.70 The court held that "the objectives of the FOIA are
such that whenever the legislature fails to specify that any records in the
public domain are to be excluded from inspection . . . then privacy must
yield to openness and secrecy to the public's right to know the status of its
own affairs., 71 Ragland requires that the General Assembly balance public
61. Id. at 402, 432 S.W.2d at 754.
62. Id. at 406, 432 S.W.2d at 756.
63. Id. at 404, 432 S.W.2d at 755.
64. Id. 404-05, 432 S.W.2d at 755 (citations omitted).
65. Id. at 405, 432 S.W.2d at 755.
66. Laman, 245 Ark. at 405-06, 432 S.W.2d at 755-56. The court focused on the Gen-
eral Assembly's use of the term "specifically" when referring to FOIA exceptions and re-
fused to create an exception to the FOIA not explicitly created by the Act. Id., 432 S.W.2d at
755.
67. 298 Ark. 219, 766 S.W.2d 909 (1989).
68. Id. at 226, 766 S.W.2d at 912.
69. 288 Ark. 81, 702 S.W.2d 23 (1986).
70. Id. at 85-86, 702 S.W.2d at 25.
71. Id., 702 S.W.2d at 25.
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access and interests of confidentiality when amending the FOIA, allows
courts to interpret ambiguity in favor of openness, and prevents court-made
exceptions that would allow for secrecy in government operations.72
2. Common Sense Approach
At times, the Arkansas Supreme Court has failed to liberally interpret
the FOIA to achieve its laudable purposes.7 3 In Sebastian County Chapter of
the American Red Cross v. Weatherford,74 the court noted that it was "aware
of the need for a balancing of interests to give effect to the intent of the
General Assembly, and [it did] so with a common sense approach.7 M That
case involved a ground lease between the City of Fort Smith and the Sebas-
tian County chapter of the American Red Cross, under which the chapter
paid the city one dollar per year to lease the property.76 The single issue was
whether the lease subjected the chapter to the FOIA because it was "sup-
ported wholly or in part by public funds. 77
Using its "common sense" approach, the court focused on the term
"public funds" and held that the term meant money that belonged to the
government,78 not "indirect benefit conveyed by [the] government upon a
private organization.,, 79 This definition meant that the nominal rent pay-
ments were merely an indirect benefit conferred upon the chapter and did
not involve the expenditure of public funds.80 The court did not believe that
the General Assembly intended for every private organization that received
any form of government assistance to be subject to the FOIA. 81 In conclu-
sion, the court stated that its interpretation was consistent with the intent of
the General Assembly and "not at odds with a liberal construction of the
72. WATKINS & PELTZ, supra note 30, at 10.
73. See, e.g., Pulaski County I, 370 Ark. 435, 260 S.W.3d 718 (2007); Sebastian County
Chapter of the Am. Red Cross v. Weatherford, 311 Ark. 656, 846 S.W.2d 641 (1993); Bryant
v. Mars, 309 Ark. 480, 830 S.W.2d 869 (1992); Simmons First Nat'l Bank v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 282 Ark. 194, 667 S.W.2d 648 (1984).
74. 311 Ark. 656, 846 S.W.2d 641 (1993).
75. Id. at 658-59, 846 S.W.2d at 643 (citing Bryant, 309 Ark. at 485, 830 S.W.2d at
872; Simmons First Nat'l Bank, 282 Ark. at 198, 667 S.W.2d at 650).
76. Id. at 656-57, 846 S.W.2d at 642.
77. Id., 846 S.W.2d at 642; ARK. CODEANN. § 25-19-106(a) (LEXIS Supp. 2007).
78. Sebastian County, 311 Ark. at 659, 846 S.W.2d at 643.
79. Id. at 660, 846 S.W.2d at 644.
80. Id. at 661, 846 S.W.2d at 645.
81. Id., 846 S.W.2d at 644. The court stated that "[h]ad the General Assembly intended
to extend the FOIA to private organizations that receive any form of government assistance
or subsidy, no matter how indirect, it would not have used the words 'supported ... by public
funds."' Id. at 660, 846 S.W.2d at 644.
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FOIA." 2 In spite of the court's assertion that its decision was consistent
with the general rules of FOIA interpretation, it is arguable that the City of
Fort Smith was subsidizing the chapter by leasing the property for what was
less than fair market value,83 which is the same result that would have been
achieved had the city directly supplied funds to the chapter to minimize its
lease obligation with a third party. Using its controversial "common sense"
approach, however, the court concluded that indirect financial support was
not a government expenditure of "public funds, '' "I even though a disburse-
ment of "public funds" could have yielded the same outcome and, thus, trig-
gered application of the FOIA.85
The general rule that FOIA exemptions and exceptions are to be nar-
rowly construed has also fallen victim to the "common sense" approach.86 In
Bryant v. Mars,87 the court held that the term "Attorney General" as used in
section 25-19-105(b)(7) of the Arkansas Code refers to the office of the At-
torney General as a collective, not just the constitutional officer.88 Section
25-19-105(b)(7) exempts "[u]npublished memoranda, working papers, and
correspondence of the Governor, members of the General Assembly, Su-
preme Court Justices, Court of Appeals Judges, and the Attorney General.,
89
Even the Attorney General admitted in his brief that the statute did not spe-
cify the sense in which "Attorney General" was used,9° but the court stated
that it was "fully aware of [its] prior decisions [that] clearly state[d] that
exemptions [were] to be narrowly construed in favor of openness ....
However, [the court was] nevertheless persuaded that the state policy [did]
not preclude an open-minded consideration of the meaning of the exemp-
tion."'" An application of the narrow construction rule would have limited
the exemption to the Attorney General as an individual, but the court held
82. Id. at 661, 846 S.W.2d at 644. Although the court said its decision was consistent
with a liberal construction, the authors of the The Arkansas Freedom of Information Act
believe that the common sense approach is a departure from the general rules of FOIA con-
struction. WATKINS & PELTZ, supra note 30, at 10. Before Sebastian County, the Arkansas
Attorney General had opined that indirect financial support was sufficient to trigger the FOIA
based on the liberal interpretation rule. Op. Ark. Att'y Gen. No. 88-004 (1988).
83. Id. at 657-58, 846 S.W.2d at 643. "[T]he parties stipulated that ... $1.00 per year
would be less than a reasonable rental value for the leased property," and the trial court con-
cluded that "the fair market value of the leased property was 'substantially more than $1 per
year' and that the lease constituted a partial support by public funds, or an expenditure of
public funds." Id., 846 S.W.2d at 643.
84. Sebastian County, 311 Ark. at 660, 846 S.W.2d at 644.
85. Id., 846 S.W.2d at 644.
86. See, e.g., Bryant v. Mars, 309 Ark. 480, 830 S.W.2d 869 (1992).
87. 309 Ark. 480, 830 S.W.2d 869 (1992).
88. Id. at 485, 830 S.W.2d at 872.
89. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-105(b)(7) (LEXIS Supp. 2007).
90. WATKINS & PELTz, supra note 30, at 11.
91. Bryant, 309 Ark. at 484, 830 S.W.2d at 871 (citations omitted).
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that the ordinary use of "Attorney General" included the elected official, his
deputies, and his representatives.92
The authors of The Arkansas Freedom of Information Act point out that
the Arkansas Supreme Court "has not stated when or how to employ the
["common sense"] balancing approach."93 Although it is unpredictable when
a court will choose to use the "common sense" approach, Professor Watkins
and Professor Peltz predict that the decision in Bryant will encourage FOIA
abuse by agencies seeking to "stretch" ambiguous FOIA exemptions. 94 They
also state that because of Bryant, Arkansans cannot be sure that Arkansas
courts will interpret FOIA ambiguities in favor of public access as the legis-
lature would have intended.95 This is because when the legislature failed to
specify that the term "Attorney General" included the officer, his deputies,
and his representatives-creating a patent ambiguity-the Arkansas Su-
preme Court did not liberally interpret the ambiguity that allows "privacy
[to] yield to openness and secrecy to the public's right to know the status of
its own affairs." 96
D. E-mails and the FOIA
E-mail has become a regular forum for public officials to communicate
within their respective agency and to their constituents.97 One survey shows
that nearly eighty-two percent of public officials use e-mails in their public
activities.9" Public access to electronic records has always been an issue un-
der FOIA, "[b]ut it was the advent of electronic mail as a pervasive channel
of communication that catapulted electronic access to the top of the public
agenda."99
The Arkansas Attorney General opined that e-mail exchanges are pub-
lic records subject to disclosure under the FOIA and are no different than
any other document falling within the definition set out in section 25-19-
92. Id., 830 S.W.2d at 871. The court deemed this understanding of the term consistent
with the intent of the General Assembly. Id. at 485, 830 S.W.2d at 872.
93. WATKINS &PELTZ, supra note 30, at 12.
94. WATKINS & PELTZ, supra note 30, at 13.
95. Id.
96. Ragland, 288 Ark. at 86, 702 S.W.2d at 25.
97. Peter S. Kozinets, Access to the E-mail Records of Public Officials Safeguarding the
Public's Right to Know, 25 A.B.A. COMM. LAW. 17, 18 (2007).
98. ELENA LARSEN & LEE RAINiE, DIGrrAL TOwN HALL: How LocAL OFFcICtALS USE THE
INTERNET AND THE Civic BENEFITS THEY CITE FROM DEALING WITH CONSTITUENTS ONLINE,
PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT 8 (2002),
http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIPDigital TownHall.pdf. Approximately one-third of
those surveyed said they have a public account and use it exclusively for public affairs,
another third said they use both personal and private e-mail accounts for public matters, and
the final third said they exclusively use personal e-mail accounts for public business. Id.
99. WATKiNS & PELTZ, supra note 30, at 431.
20091
UALR LAW REVIEW
103(5)(A) of the Arkansas Code.' °° The Attorney General has even sug-
gested that e-mail exchanges may constitute public meetings, thereby requir-
ing public notice and access.0 ° Through these opinions, the Attorney Gener-
al has made it clear that e-mail may not be used to undermine the FOIA's
requirements. °2 Unfortunately, e-mails continue to create problems for the
FOIA.
One issue with e-mail involves the relationship between the FOIA and
records retention. 10 3 Professor Peltz wrote that "a freedom of information
system can only be as strong as its companion records retention program.
' 104
Because electronic records are easily created, modified, and destroyed,
states, including Arkansas, have struggled to develop effective retention
programs for electronic records because of their "ephemeral" nature.' °5 E-
mails pose an even greater threat because as public officials and employees
increase the use of e-mail as a convenient means of communication, they are
also deleting e-mails at an exponential rate. 1°6
Another issue with e-mail involves public employees' right to priva-
cy.'07 As the use of e-mail to conduct public affairs has increased in recent
years, so has the use of public e-mail accounts for private purposes.108 The
highest courts of several states have confronted this issue in FOIA litigation,
and this section focuses on how the highest courts of Ohio, °9 Arizona,"0
Colorado,'' Florida,' 12 and Idaho" 3 have dealt with this question of great
public concern and importance." 1
4
100. Op. Ark. Att'y Gen. No. 99-018 (1999). When requested by certain public officials,
the Arkansas Attorney General may give his opinion on any constitutional or other legal
question that involves the discharge of the officials' duties, but the opinion is not binding and
lacks legal force. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-16-706 (LEXIS Repl. 2002).
101. See Op. Ark. Att'y Gen. No. 2000-096 (2000) (stating that a determination will
depend on the facts of a particular case).
102. WATKINS & PELTZ, supra note 30, at 432.
103. Richard J. Peltz, Arkansas's Public Records Retention Program: Finding the FOIA 's
Absent Partner, 28 U. ARK. LrrrLE ROCK L. REv. 175, 175 (2006) (stating that lack of a
sound records retention program will render public records laws useless).
104. Id. at 177.
105. Id. at 198, 204; WATKINS & PELTZ, supra note 30, at 431.
106. WATKINS & PELTZ, supra note 30, at 431.
107. Kozinets, supra note 97, at 17.
108. WATKINS & PELTZ, supra note 30, at 436.
109. See infra Part II.D.1.
110. See infra Part II.D.2.
111. See infra Part II.D.3.
112. See infra Part II.D.4.
113. See infra Part II.D.5.
114. The Washington Court of Appeals has also dealt with the issue of e-mails and public
employees' privacy. Tiberino v. Spokane County, 13 P.3d 1104, 1106 (Wash. Ct. App.
2000). In Tiberino, the Washington Court of Appeals held that the e-mails at issue were re-




In 1998, the Ohio Supreme Court became one of the first jurisdictions
to face the issue of e-mails as public records."' In Ohio, a public record
must be a document "which serves to document the organization, functions,
policies, decisions, procedures, operations, or other activities of the of-
fice."'"16 State ex. rel. Wilson-Simmons v. Lake County Sheriffs Department
involved e-mails exchanged between public employees that allegedly con-
tained racial slurs." 7 The court held that a public record was not "any piece
of paper on which a public officer writes something [,] . . . [and] [t]o the
extent that any item... [did] not serve to document the organization,. . . it
[was] not a public record and need not be disclosed."' 1 8 The court did not
regard the fact that the e-mails were created, exchanged, and maintained on
a government e-mail system as dispositive. " 9 The court concluded that the
racist e-mails were not public records subject to disclosure because they
were never used to conduct the public's business. 0
2. Arizona
In 2007, the Arizona Supreme Court held that personal e-mails were
not public records.' 2 ' Furthermore, the court held that when a government
entity withholds e-mails and claims that they are personal, the requester may
ask a court to review the e-mails in camera to determine if they are public
records subject to disclosure.
22
In 2005, the Pinal County Sheriffs Office began investigating alleged
improper conduct by a high-ranking county official. 123 The official, Stanley
Griffis, later entered into a plea agreement with prosecutors on six felony
charges for embezzlement, fraud, and tax evasion. 24 Phoenix Newspapers,
Inc. (PNI) filed a public records request with the county seeking Mr. Grif-
for personal information. Id. at 1108-09. Washington statutorily exempts from disclosure
"[p]ersonal information ... to the extent that disclosure would violate [an employee's] right
to privacy." WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.56.230(2) (LexisNexis 2008). Because the state of
Washington's highest court did not decide Tiberino, it is not further discussed in this note.
115. State ex rel. Wilson-Simmons v. Lake County Sheriff's Dept., 693 N.E.2d 789 (Ohio
1998).
116. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 149.011(G) (West 2008).
117. State ex rel. Wilson-Simmons, 693 N.E.2d at 792-93.
118. Id. at 792.
119. Id. at793.
120. Id.
121. Griffis v. Pinal County, 156 P.3d 418, 419 (Ariz. 2007).
122. Id. at 419-20.
123. Id. at 420.
124. Id.; Kozinets, supra note 97, at 19.
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fis's e-mails.'25 The county released 706 e-mails, but withheld several, citing
Mr. Griffis's privacy as grounds for denial. 126 After PNI threatened suit, the
county decided to release the remaining e-mails, and Mr. Griffis obtained a
preliminary injunction that blocked their release. 127 The trial court dissolved
the injunction, presumed that the e-mails were public records, and ordered
their disclosure. 2 8 The court of appeals reversed, holding that personal e-
mails were not public records subject to disclosure under Arizona's public
records law.'29
The Arizona Supreme Court commenced its discussion by stating that
"Arizona law defines 'public records' broadly and creates a presumption
requiring the disclosure of public documents."' 130 Although the term "public
records" is not statutorily defined in Arizona, the state's courts have devel-
oped three alternative definitions of the term "public records."' 3' The court
made clear that the definitions, however broad, are not unlimited.'32
The court held that "public records" were "only those documents hav-
ing a 'substantial nexus' with a government agency's activities."'' 33 Further-
more, to determine whether a document is a public record, the court held
that a content-driven inquiry was required to determine whether the requisite





130. Id. at 421 (emphasis added). Arizona's "presumption of disclosure of public records"
is distinguishable from Arkansas's statutory presumption of public record status found in
section 25-19-103(5)(A) of the Arkansas Code. In Arkansas, every non-exempt public record
is subject to disclosure, meaning that disclosure is absolute and not presumed as is the case
under Arizona law. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-105 (LEXIS Supp. 2007). To further its desire
of liberal public access to government records, the Arkansas General Assembly created a
presumption that certain documents are by definition "public records," thereby placing the
burden on the government to rebut that presumption. See id. § 25-19-103(5)(A) (LEXIS
Supp. 2007). Once presumed to be public records, these documents are subject to disclosure
unless the government can rebut this presumption or prove that the documents are subject to a
statutory FOIA exception. See id. § 25-19-105.
131. Griffis, 156 P.3d at 421. The three definitions of public records are:
[(1) a record] made by a public officer in pursuance of a duty, the immediate
purpose of which is to disseminate information to the public, or to serve as a
memorial of official transactions for public reference; [(2)] a record that is re-
quired to be kept, or necessary to be kept in the discharge of a duty imposed by
law or directed by law to serve as a memorial and evidence of something written,
said or done; or [(3)] any written record of transactions of a public officer in his
office, which is a convenient and appropriate method of discharging his duties
and is kept by him as such, whether required by... law or not.





connection to government activity existed."3 The content-driven analysis
ruled out possession as a determining factor of what constituted a public
record, effectively exempting personal effects from disclosure.'35 The court
stated "the purpose of the law [was] to open government activity to public
scrutiny, not to disclose information about private citizens."'3 6
Though it did not specify what constituted a substantial nexus with
government activities, the court reiterated the importance of this connection
in determining whether a document qualified as a public record.'37 Before
ever applying any presumption of disclosure, the court stated that a review-
ing court must initially determine if the document is even a "public
record.'38 In making this determination, in camera review of a contested
document is necessary because its nature and purpose provide the necessary
link to government activities. 3 9
Outlining the process by which a court is to determine if the document
is a "public record," the court stated that the document requester bears the
burden to ask for an in camera review after the government denies the dis-
closure request on a personal privacy basis. 4 ' Once a requester shows that
an in camera review is required, the burden then shifts to the government
agency or other party opposing disclosure to prove that the documents are
not public records.' 4' Even if the government agency cannot carry this bur-
den, the Arizona courts are required to "consider whether privacy, confiden-
tiality, or the best interests of the state outweigh the policy in favor of dis-
closure."
142
The Arizona Supreme Court remanded the case because the e-mails




137. Griffis, 156 P.3d at 422.
138. Id. Again, in Arkansas, there is not a presumption of disclosure; there is a presump-
tion of public record status. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-103(5)(a) (LEXIS Supp. 2007). This
presumption immediately attaches to "[a]ll records maintained in public offices or by em-
ployees within the scope their employment." Id. Upon attachment of the presumption, the
record is subject to disclosure unless the presumption is overcome or a FOIA exception is
applicable. Id. § 25-19-105.
139. Id.
140. Griffis, 156 P.3d at 423.
141. Id.
142. Id. Although the Arizona Supreme Court initiated this decision by outlining Arizo-
na's broad disclosure requirements, the state's courts have broad discretion in determining
whether documents "that have already been categorized as public records" should not be
disclosed if "privacy interests, confidentiality or the best interests of the state outweigh the
public's right of access." Id. at 423 n.8.
143. Id. at 423.
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conduct the necessary in camera review to determine whether Mr. Griffis'
e-mails were public records subject to disclosure.'"
3. Colorado
In 2005, the Colorado Supreme Court determined that the term "public
records" included only those records that a public agency makes, maintains,
or keeps and that "have a demonstrable connection to the exercise of' public
functions.' 45 The court's decision reversed in part, affirmed in part, and re-
manded the decision of the court of appeals, 146 which ruled that the e-mails
at issue were public records subject to a constitutional privacy exception.
147
The Colorado Supreme Court believed that the court of appeals unnecessari-
ly considered the constitutional question, and held that the Colorado Open
Records Act (CORA) required an examination of the content of the re-
quested e-mails to determine whether the e-mail records were actually pub-
lic records.'48
The case involved e-mails exchanged between an elected official and a
public employee, who allegedly were engaged in an affair.' 49 In 2002, the
Board of County Commissioners of Arapahoe County initiated an investiga-
tion of the county clerk and recorder's office based on allegations of sexual
harassment, violation of open meeting laws, and misuse of public property
and funds. 5' The county hired a private investigator, who created a report
setting forth his findings.' 5 ' The report included 622 e-mail messages be-
tween the two parties, 570 of which contained sexually explicit or romantic
content. 52 The county released the report but redacted the sexually explicit
messages.'53 Following the release, the Denver Publishing Company re-
quested disclosure of a non-redacted copy." The county did not release
such a version and filed a petition with the trial court seeking a determina-
tion as to whether it should release a non-redacted copy. 155 The elected offi-
cial and public employee contested the necessity of any disclosure.
156
144. Id.
145. Denver Publ'g Co. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of the County of Arapahoe, 121 P.3d
190, 198 (Colo. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).
146. Id. at 205.
147. Id. at 191.
148. Id. at 192.
149. Id.
150. Id.




155. Id. at 192-93.
156. Id. at 193.
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The Colorado Supreme Court began its "analysis where all CORA
analysis begins-determining if the records at issue are public records with-
in the scope of CORA's mandatory disclosure provisions."'57 The court de-
termined that the Colorado General Assembly intended for a limited defini-
tion of "public records" that excluded private information and documents.'
58
Focusing on the CORA's definition of "public records," the court held
that e-mail records were no different from other public record writings that
were subject to disclosure; that is, e-mails must also be made, maintained, or
kept for use in government activity if they are to be disclosed. 59
"[P]ossession, creation, or receipt of an e-mail record by a public official or
employee" was also ruled out as determinative of an e-mail's status as a
public record.' 6° In determining whether an e-mail record constituted a pub-
lic record, the court concluded that the inquiry must be content-driven to
ensure that the necessary connection to government functions existed.
161
Based on a review of the e-mails' content, the court concluded that
none of the e-mail messages at issue displayed the necessary connection to
the performance of public functions. 62 The court remanded the case to the
trial court with the direction to redact any sexually explicit content from the
e-mails. 163 Stating that the CORA did not require the disclosure of entire
documents or mandate that public officials or employees distinguish be-
tween private and public e-mails, the court held that its protection of the
parties' privacy rights was consistent with the intent of the Colorado Gener-
al Assembly.' 64
4. Florida
In 2003, the Florida Supreme Court addressed the issue of "[w]hether
all e-mails transmitted or received by public employees of a government
agency are public records.., by virtue of their placement on a government-
owned computer system."'' 65 The court concluded that personal e-mails did
not fall within the definition of "public records" because they "[were] not
made or received pursuant to law or ordinance or in connection with the
157. Denver Publ'g Co., 121 P.3dat 195.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 198.
160. Id. at 199.
161. Id. at 199, 200.
162. Id. at 203.
163. Denver Publ'g Co., 121 P.3d at 205.
164. Id.
165. State v. City of Clearwater, 863 So. 2d 149, 150 (Fla. 2003).
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transaction of official business" as defined in section 119.011(11) of the
Florida Statutes.' 66
In 2000, a Times Publishing Company ("Times") reporter submitted a
public records request to the City of Clearwater seeking disclosure of all e-
mails exchanged between two city employees between October 1, 1999, and
October 6, 2000.167 After the request, the employees reviewed their e-mails
and designated which were personal and which were public. 68 Subsequent-
ly, the city disclosed the public e-mails but retained those deemed person-
al. 69 The Times filed suit, asserting that it was entitled to all of the e-
mails. 70
The Florida Supreme Court began, as most courts have, by looking at
what constitutes a public record under Florida law. 71 It quickly concluded
that "public records" referred only to those records that were related to offi-
cial government business.1 72 Therefore, the personal e-mails at issue fell
outside of the definition of public records because of the simple fact that
they were in no way connected to official business.'
The court rejected the Times's argument that placement of the e-mails
on a city-owned computer automatically made the e-mails public records.'74
It stated that a possession rule would yield absurd results, such as requiring
disclosure of a public employee's personal utility bills by virtue of place-
ment in a state-owned desk. 75 Therefore, e-mails, just as any other public
record, "must have been prepared 'in connection with official agency busi-
ness' and be 'intended to perpetuate, communicate, or formalize knowledge
of such type"' to be subject to disclosure.1 76 Consistent with the emerging
trend in cases involving public employees' right to privacy in e-mail, 177 the
Florida Supreme Court concluded that the nature of an e-mail record deter-
166. Id. at 155. Section 119.011(11) of the Florida Statutes defines "public records" as
"all documents, papers, letters, maps, books, tapes, photographs, films, sound recordings,
data processing software, or other material, regardless of the physical form, characteristics, or
means of transmission, made or received pursuant to law or ordinance or in connection with
the transaction of official business by any agency." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 119.011(11) (LEXIS
2007).
167. Clearwater, 863 So. 2d at 150.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 151.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 151-52.
172. Id. at 152. The court looked to Florida case law as far back as 1889 and determined
"that the connection between public records and official business was established well before
the [lIegislature" defined the term "public records" in 1967. Clearwater, 863 So. 2d at 152.
173. Id. at 153.
174. Id. at 154.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See supra Part H(D)(1-3).
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In 2007, the Idaho Supreme Court addressed the issue of e-mails as
public records. 179 The case was a result of public scrutiny surrounding the
downfall of the Kootenai County Juvenile Education and Training (JET)
Court, which was overseen by the county prosecutor and funded by a grant
from the United States Department of Justice. 8° When the JET Court failed
to provide a quarterly finance report, the Department of Justice suspended
its funding, and the JET Court was terminated.'
8'
Local officials accused Marina Kalani, the program's manager, of in-
appropriate and unprofessional conduct that led to the demise of the JET
Court.'82 Allegations also arose of an improper relationship between Kalani
and the county prosecutor, William Douglas. 3 Douglas denied the exis-
tence of such a relationship and publicly defended Kalani's management of
the JET Court." 4
A county investigation into the allegations of misconduct uncovered
over one thousand e-mails exchanged between Kalani and Douglas. 8 5 A
local newspaper reporter requested disclosure of the e-mails for the purpose
of public inspection. 86 The county disclosed 172 complete e-mails, 287
redacted e-mails, and withheld 597 others.8 7 Cowles Publishing, the owner
of the local newspaper, filed suit and demanded the release of the remaining
e-mails. l88 The trial court found that the e-mails were public records and
ordered their disclosure; Kalani subsequently appealed. 89
In Idaho, a "public record" is defined as "a writing that (1) contains in-
formation relating to the conduct or administration of the public's business,
and (2) was prepared, owned, used or retained by a governmental agen-
cy."' 90 Furthermore, the Idaho legislature has defined "public records" so
178. Clearwater, 863 So. 2d at 154.
179. Cowles Publ'g Co. v. Kootenai County Bd. of County Comn'rs, 159 P.3d 896 (Ida-
ho 2007).









189. Id. at 900.
190. Id. at 900 (citing IDAHO CODE ANN. § 9-337(13) (2007)).
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broadly that a document may be subject to disclosure even if it does not
satisfy the statutory definition. 9' The Idaho Supreme Court held that a doc-
ument's "relation to legitimate public interest . . . makes [it] a public
record."'
192
Focusing on its definition of "public records," the court, unlike most
courts faced with the issue, held that the e-mails at issue were public records
subject to disclosure. 9 3 First, the court believed the e-mails were sufficiently
connected to the public's business because the public had an interest in the
communications between an elected official and his subordinate, especially
when the official publicly defended his subordinate's management of the
public's business. 94 Second, the court determined that the e-mails were
created by county employees, used in a county investigation, and owned by
the county. 195 Following these findings, the court concluded that the e-mails
were public records because both prongs of its definition of "public records"
were satisfied. 96 The court emphasized, however, that "[i]t [was] not simply
the fact that the e-mails were sent and received while the employees were at
work or the fact that they were 'in' the employee's office that makes them a
public record."' 97
Concerned with the e-mails' relation to the public's legitimate interest
in making its determination, the court focused on the underlying facts of the
case, including: (1) the relationship between the elected official and his
subordinate, (2) the fact that the e-mail exchange utilized county-owned
computers, and (3) the official's public defense of his subordinate and her
management of the JET Court.'98 The court believed these factors brought
the e-mail within the realm of legitimate public interest.' 99
Although the court held that possession alone was insufficient to make
a document a public record, the court did not adopt a content-based ap-
proach to determine if an e-mail is a public record subject to disclosure.z °
Rather, the court classified the e-mails as public records by focusing on the
191. Cowles Publ'g Co., 159 P.3d at 900. Section 9-337(13) defines "public record" to
include "any writing containing information relating to the conduct or administration of the
public's business prepared, owned, used or retained by any state agency . . . regardless of
physical form or characteristics." IDAHO CODE ANN. § 9-337(13) (2007).
192. Cowles Publ'g Co., 159 P.3d at 901.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 900.
195. Id. The court stated that because the second prong of the definition contains the
conjunction "or," a writing did not have to satisfy all three tests contained therein. Id.
196. Id. at 901.






context in which they were created and exchanged in relation to the public
interests involved. 20'
Approximately two months after the Idaho Supreme Court decided
Cowles Publishing Co. v. Kootenai County Board of County Commission-
ers, the Arkansas Supreme Court had to decide whether so-called "personal"
e-mails created, exchanged, and saved on a government e-mail system were
"public records" subject to disclosure under the Arkansas FOIA.
Ill. THE CASE
The dispute over a former Pulaski County official's e-mails began in
early June of 2007 when the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette made a routine
request under the Arkansas FOIA.202 The request followed the arrest of the
official on charges of embezzlement. 20 3 The county released some of the
requested e-mails and asserted that the remaining e-mails were "personal"
and, therefore, not "public records" subject to disclosure.2' The county's
refusal to release all of the e-mails lead to a swift two months of litigation
that concluded with the Arkansas Supreme Court's most recent interpreta-
tion of what constitutes a "public record."2 5
This section first describes what events motivated the Arkansas Demo-
crat-Gazette to request the e-mails and provides the procedural history of the
case.2' This section also discusses the Pulaski County2 decision and its
various opinions. 8
A. Facts
On June 5, 2007, Arkansas Democrat-Gazette reporter Van Jensen
submitted a written FOIA request to Pulaski County Attorney Karla Bur-
nett.2' The newspaper requested that the county "disclose 'all e-mail and
other recorded communication between former Pulaski County Comptroller
and Director of Administrative Services Ron Quillin and employees of Gov-
ernment e-Management Solutions [(GEMS)], a software contractor for Pu-
laski County, from Jan[uary] 2005 to the termination of Mr. Quillin's em-
201. Id. at 901.
202. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 25-19-101 to -109 (LEXIS Repl. 2002 & Supp. 2007).
203. See infra Part IM.A.
204. See infra Part III.A.
205. Pulaski County L, 370 Ark. 435, 260 S.W.3d 718 (2007).
206. See infra Part IM.A.
207. For purposes of this note, Pulaski County I and Pulaski County I are analyzed as
two halves of a single decision. Where the note refers to the case as Pulaski County, it is
referring to the decision as a whole rather than its various decisions and opinions.
208. See infra Part II.B.
209. Pulaski County I, 370 Ark. at 437, 260 S.W.3d at 719.
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ployment with the county. '210 The request came one day after Mr. Quillin
was arrested on embezzlement charges for allegedly stealing approximately
$42,000 of public funds.21'
Pulaski County had an ongoing contractual relationship with GEMS.212
Mr. Quillin represented the county in this matter and "was responsible for
the flow of public funds from the [c]ounty to GEMS. 2 3 GEMS was a coun-
ty contractor that had sold the county more than $1 million of software and
214services. While maintaining the county's relationship with GEMS, Mr.
Quillin was engaged in an extramarital affair with the GEMS vendor who
managed the Pulaski County account.215 Mr. Quillin later admitted to author-
ities that he began embezzling the money to maintain his affair and the
"extravagant lifestyle he had been leading since the affair began. 21 6
Before being terminated, Mr. Quillin deleted all of the e-mails on his
computer, including those between him and his lover.217 Pulaski County,
however, had the deleted e-mails restored before the Arkansas Democrat-
Gazette made its FOIA request.2 8 On June 12, 2007, in an attempt to satisfy
the FOIA request, the county released some of the restored e-mails between
Mr. Quillin and GEMS. 29 The county refused to release all of the e-mails,
claiming that some did not constitute "public records" subject to disclosure
under the FOIA °
On June 14, 2007, the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette filed a complaint in
Pulaski County Circuit Court seeking to challenge Pulaski County's refusal
to disclose all of the requested e-mails. 221 The suit named both Pulaski
County and Pulaski County Attorney Karla Burnett as defendants.22 At a
hearing on June 19, 2007, Pulaski County Attorney Karla Burnett was dis-
missed, and "Jane Doe" was allowed to intervene in the case.223 Also at the
hearing, Pulaski County Circuit Judge Mary Spencer McGowan heard tes-
210. Id., 260 S.W.3d at719.
211. Id., 260 S.W.3d at 719.
212. Pulaski County ll, 371 Ark. 217, 218, 264 S.W.3d 465, 466 (2007).
213. Id.,465 S.W.3d at 466.
214. Kristin Netterstrom & Amy Upshaw, Quillin E-Mails Released, Show Steamy Affair;
Messages Reveal Pair Making Plans to Meet, Trading Photos, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETE,
Oct. 9, 2007, at Front Section.
215. Pulaski County 11, 371 Ark. at 219,264 S.W.3d at 466.
216. Netterstrom & Upshaw, supra note 210.
217. Pulaski County 1, 370 Ark. at 437, 260 S.W.3d at 719.
218. Id., 260 S.W.3d at 719.
219. Id., 260 S.W.3d at 719.
220. Id., 260 S.W.3d at 719.
221. Id., 260 S.W.3d at 719.
222. Id., 260 S.W.3d at 719.
223. Pulaski County 1, 370 Ark. at 437, 260 S.W.3d at 719-20. Mr. Quillen's lover,
Cheryl Zeier, was allowed to intervene in this case and is referred to as "Jane Doe" in the
court's opinions. Netterstrom & Upshaw, supra note 210.
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timony from Van Jensen, Arkansas Democrat-Gazette managing editor Da-
vid Bailey, and a Pulaski County Information Systems hardware analyst
who maintained the county's file servers. 4
On June 25, 2007, Judge McGowan issued a final judgment in favor of
the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette and ordered the county to release all e-
mails within twenty-four hours.225 Pulaski County filed a notice of appeal
and a motion for stay pending appeal, but Judge McGowan denied the mo-
tion.226 The county "then filed motions to expedite and for stay pending ap-
peal" with the Arkansas Supreme Court,2 both of which were granted.228
The supreme court also demanded that the parties submit briefs addressing
the following issues:
1. Do Pulaski County and the intervenor, Jane Doe, have standing to
raise an [sic] FOIA issue?
2. Are personal e-mails in a county computer exempt from the FOIA? If
so, under what circumstances?
3. Did the intervenor waive all privacy rights by sending e-mails to a
county computer?
4. Is it necessary for this court to do an in camera review of the e-mails
to distinguish personal from business e-mails?
229
On July 20, 2007, the Arkansas Supreme Court delivered its opinion
and remanded the case to the circuit court for an in camera review. 230 The
supreme court held that there was insufficient evidence in the record to sup-
port the circuit court's factual findings that the e-mails at issue were public
records subject to disclosure under the FOIA.2 1' The supreme court held that
the only way to make such a determination is to examine the e-mails.
232
224. Pulaski County 1, 370 Ark. at 437-38, 260 S.W.3d at 720. The county called Profes-
sor Richard Peltz to obtain his opinion concerning hypothetical situations, but the court ex-
cluded his testimony. Brief of Appellant at 33-38, Pulaski County 1, 370 Ark. 435, 260
S.W.3d 718 (2007) (No. 07-669). Professor Peltz is a professor at the University of Arkansas
at Little Rock William H. Bowen School of Law, has authored several publications regarding
the Arkansas FOIA, and is regularly requested to give his opinion on FOIA matters. Id. at 33.
225. Id., 260 S.W.3d at 720.
226. Id., 260 S.W.3d at 720.
227. Id., 260 S.W.3d at 720.
228. Pulaski County v. Ark. Democrat-Gazette, Inc., 370 Ark. 433, 434, 260 S.W.3d 298,
298 (2007) ("Pulaski County ll"). The motion was granted by the court on June 28, 2007.
Id., 260 S.W.3d at 298. This is the first of three minor decisions delivered in this case. See
infra note 232.
229. Pulaski County II, 370 Ark. at 434-35, 260 S.W.3d at 298.
230. Pulaski County 1, 370 Ark. at 446, 260 S.W.3d at 726.
231. Id. at 445-46, 260 S.W.3d at 725.
232. Id. at 446, 260 S.W.3d at 725.
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Consequently, the court remanded the case to the circuit court to review the
e-mails to determine if they were actually public records.233
On remand, the circuit court reviewed the content of each e-mail. 234
Following this review, the circuit court ordered disclosure of all the e-mails
"with the exception of six graphic, sexually explicit photos and seven e-
mails sent on a chain of forwards. 23 5 Pulaski County once again appealed
the circuit court's decision.236
On its second appeal to the Arkansas Supreme Court, Pulaski County
argued that the circuit court failed to properly follow the supreme court's
order for an in camera review. 237 Jane Doe argued that release of the e-mails
would violate her right to privacy.238 The supreme court held, as the circuit
court had found, that Jane Doe waived her right to privacy and had no ex-
pectation that the e-mails she sent to Mr. Quillin on the county computer
would remain private. 239 The supreme court also stated that the record did
not support Pulaski County's assertion that the circuit court failed to follow
its mandate for in camera review.2' After rejecting the appellants' argu-
ments, the supreme court affirmed the circuit court's order to disclose the e-
mails.24
B. Reasoning
This section lays out how the Arkansas Supreme Court reached its de-
cision in Pulaski County. 242 First, this section discusses the court's decision
233. Id., 260 S.W.3d at 726.
234. Pulaski County I, 371 Ark. at 221, 264 S.W.3d at 468 (2007).
235. Id. at 219, 264 S.W.3d at 467.
236. Id., 264 S.W.3d at 467. The other minor decisions in this case were delivered before
Pulaski County I. On August 22, 2007, the supreme court granted motions for clarification
and to expedite and denied a motion to lift stay, all of which were filed by the Arkansas
Democrat-Gazette. Pulaski County v. Ark. Democrat-Gazette, Inc., 370 Ark. 456, 456, 260
S.W.3d 299, 299 (2007). On August 31, 2007, the supreme court granted the Arkansas Dem-
ocrat-Gazette's motion to unseal appellate briefs after remand, but the court did not unseal a
CD-ROM that contained the e-mails at issue. Pulaski County v. Ark. Democrat-Gazette, Inc.,
370 Ark. 459, 459, 260 S.W.3d 732, 732 (2007).
237. Pulaski County II, 371 Ark. at 221, 264 S.W.3d at 467.
238. Id. at 220, 264 S.W.3d at 467.
239. Id. at 221, 264 S.W.3d at 468.
240. Id., 264 S.W.3d at 468.
241. Id. at 222, 264 S.W.3d at 468.
242. The court dealt with multiple issues in this case; however, for purposes of this note,
only two issues will be addressed in detail. The other issues included whether Jane Doe had
standing to raise a FOIA issue and whether disclosure of the e-mails violated her constitu-
tional right to privacy, both of which were issues the court addressed in Pulaski County II.
Pulaski County II, 371 Ark. at 219-21, 264 S.W.3d at 466-68. Therefore, this section focuses
primarily on the court's reasoning in Pulaski County I, specifically the issues of whether the
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as to whether e-mails on government computers are "public records" as de-
fined by the FOIA.243 Second, this section looks at the court's decision re-
garding the necessity of an in camera review of the e-mails at issue.2" Fi-
nally, this section discusses each additional opinion issued in this case: (1)
Justice Glaze's dissent in Pulaski County I, in which Justice Imber and Jus-
tice Danielson joined;245 (2) Justice Glaze's dissent in Pulaski County 1I;24
(3) Justice Imber's dissent in Pulaski County I, in which Justice Glaze and
Justice Danielson joined;247 and (4) Justice Danielson's opinion in Pulaski
County II, joined by Justice Imber, in which he concurred in part and dis-
sented in part.248
1. E-mails as "Public Records"
This section focuses on the majority's reasoning in Pulaski County L It
discusses the majority's interpretation of the definition of "public records"
as that term is used in the Arkansas FOIA. 249 This section also discusses the
court's adoption of a content-driven analysis for determining whether an e-
mail constitutes a public record subject to disclosure.25°
a. The limit of public records
When the supreme court granted Pulaski County's motion for stay
pending appeal, the court directed the parties to file briefs analyzing, among
other things, whether personal e-mails in a county computer were exempt
from the FOIA. 1 The court concluded, however, that the issue was not one
of exemption, but was an issue of whether such e-mails were even public
records as defined by the FOIA.252 At that point, the case became a matter of
statutory interpretation to determine what constituted a public record under
section 25-19-103(5)(A) of the Arkansas Code.253
e-mails were "public records" and whether in camera review was necessary. Pulaski County
1, 370 Ark. at 438-44, 260 S.W.3d at 720-24.
243. See infra Part III.B.1.
244. See infra Part III.B.2.
245. See infra Part III.B.3.
246. See infra Part III.B.4.
247. See infra Part III.B.5.
248. See infra Part III.B.6.
249. See infra Part III.B.l.a.
250. See infra Part III.B.1.b.
251. Pulaski County III, 370 Ark. 433, 434, 260 S.W.3d 298, 298 (2007).
252. Pulaski County 1, 370 Ark. 435, 438, 260 S.W.3d 718, 720 (2007).
253. Id. at 439, 260 S.W.3d at 721. In analyzing this issue, the court used a de novo stan-
dard of review. Id., 260 S.W.3d at 720 (citing Harris v. City of Fort Smith, 366 Ark. 277,
280, 234 S.W.3d 875, 878 (2006)). Though not bound by the trial court's interpretation, the
supreme court would accept it as long as it were not shown that the lower court erred in its
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The court began by stating that it "liberally interpret[ed] the FOIA to
accomplish its broad and laudable purpose that public business be per-
formed in an open and public manner . . . [and] broadly construe[d] the
[FOIA] in favor of disclosure. '254 The court, however, confessed that:
While recognizing [its] commitment to the general proposition that the
FOIA should be broadly construed in favor of disclosure and exceptions
construed narrowly in order to counter balance the self-protective inter-
ests of the governmental bureaucracy, [it was] also aware of the need for
a balancing of interests to give effect to what [it] perceive[d] to be the in-
tent of the General Assembly. In doing so a common sense approach
must be taken.
255
In determining what the Arkansas General Assembly intended public
records to include, the court quoted extensively from The Arkansas Freedom
of Information Act.256 The court relied on the book to discuss how "the legis-
lature apparently did not intend that every record maintained by an agency
be subject to public inspection, because the 'performance' language in
[s]ection 25-19-103(5)(A) limits the term 'otherwise kept"' and narrows the
meaning of public records.257 The court also cited an Arkansas Attorney
General opinion, which stated that the presumption found in section 25-19-
103(5)(A) may be rebutted by showing that the records do not satisfy the
first sentence of the section.2 8 Relying on these interpretations, the court
concluded that the general assembly intended for some limitation as to what
items constitute public records, specifically that "[p]ublic records are limited
by definition to 'records of the performance or lack of performance of offi-
cial functions."' 9
b. Content-driven analysis
Next, the court focused on whether the e-mails satisfied the definition
of public records set out in section 25-19-103(5)(A).21 Pulaski County ar-
gued that a court must look to the content of a document, rather than its lo-
interpretation. Id., 260 S.W.3d at 720-21 (citing Fox v. Perroni, 358 Ark. 251, 256, 188
S.W.3d 881, 885 (2004)).
254. Id., 260 S.W.3d at 721 (citing Fox, 358 Ark. at 256, 188 S.W.3d at 885).
255. Id. at 439-40, 260 S.W.3d at 721 (citing Bryant v. Mars, 309 Ark. 480, 485, 830
S.W.2d 869, 871 (1992)).
256. Pulaski County I, 370 Ark. at 440-41, 444, 260 S.W.3d at 721-22, 724 (citing
WATKINS & PELTZ, supra note 30).
257. Id. at 440, 260 S.W.3d at 721-22 (quoting WATKwS & PELTZ, supra note 30, at 91,
93).
258. Id. at 440-41, 260 S.W.3d at 722 (citing Op. Ark. Att'y Gen. No. 2005-095 (2005)).
259. Id. at 441, 260 S.W.3d at 722 (quoting WATKINS & PELTZ, supra note 30, at 437)
260. Id., 260 S.W.3d at 722.
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cation, when determining whether the document is a public record subject to
disclosure.26 The court discussed decisions from other jurisdictions that
adopted a content-driven analysis in determining whether a document was
subject to disclosure.262
Consistent with those decisions, the court took the stance that the na-
ture of a record, not its physical location, was dispositive as to public record
status.263 Furthermore, the court held that a context-based analysis was in-
sufficient to determine what constituted a public record. 26 Therefore, the
court concluded that a fact-specific, content-based inquiry was necessary to
determine whether a document was so closely related to the performance of
government functions as to deem the document a public record subject to
disclosure.265
2. In Camera Review
Pulaski County argued that an in camera review was necessary for a
court to properly classify an e-mail as a public record based upon the e-
mail's content.266 The court agreed that the only way to conduct this content-
based "inquiry, while maintaining the privacy of personal, non-public doc-
uments" was to allow such a review.267 The court compared the instant case
to other cases where the government claimed a FOIA exemption.268 In ex-
emption cases, circuit courts are required to conduct an in camera review to
determine whether the claimed exemption applies or whether the informa-
tion should be disclosed, thereby preventing government abuse of the
FOIA.269
The court again relied on The Arkansas Freedom of Information Act to
support its belief that in camera review was the appropriate method for dis-
cerning whether e-mails constituted public records.27° It reasoned that in
261. Id.
262. Pulaski County I, 370 Ark. at 441-43, 260 S.W.3d at 722-24. The court relied on the
cases from the highest courts of Florida, Colorado, and Arizona discussed in Part I of this
note. Id., 260 S.W.3d at 722-24; see supra Part II.D.2-4.
263. Pulaski County 1, 370 Ark. at 442, 260 S.W.3d at 722 (citing State v. City of Clear-
water, 863 So. 2d 149, 154 (Fla. 2003)).
264. Id., 260 S.W.3d at 723 (quoting Denver Publ'g Co. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 121
P.3d 190, 202 (Colo. 2005)).
265. Id. at 446, 260 S.W.3d at 724-25.
266. Id. at 443, 260 S.W.3d at 723.
267. Id. at 444, 260 S.W.3d at 724.
268. Id. at 443-44, 260 S.W.3d at 724.
269. Pulaski County 1, 370 Ark. at 443-44, 260 S.W.3d at 724.
270. Id. at 444, 260 S.W.3d at 724 (quoting WATKINS & PELrZ, supra note 30, at 437-
38). The authors of the book suggest that an e-mail requester who raises a sufficient "doubt as
to the reliability of a record segregation process ... could obtain an in camera review by a
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camera review would allow a court to determine whether an e-mail deemed
"personal" is in fact a public record subject to disclosure. 27 1 The court con-
cluded that in camera review was proper because it would allow a neutral
court, rather than a document requester or the government, to determine
whether the requested e-mails constituted public records, while simulta-
neously protecting the privacy of personal, non-public documents.272
3. Justice Glaze's First Dissent
In Pulaski County I, Justice Glaze dissented, stating that remanding the
case would "seriously weaken the FOIA and its legislative intent., 273 He
traced the history of the court's interpretations of the FOIA back to Laman
v. McCord.274 Applying the principles of Laman, Justice Glaze looked to the
plain language definition of public records. 275 He believed that the facts of
the case brought the e-mails at issue within the definition of "public
records."27 6 More specifically, he stated that "the personal and professional
relationship between Quillin and Doe may have affected or influenced Quil-
lin's performance and his expenditures of county funds," making the ex-
changed e-mails records of his performance or lack of performance of his
official functions.277
Alternatively, Justice Glaze argued that Quillin's e-mails were statuto-
rily presumed to be public records because Quillin maintained and used the
e-mails to conduct county business.278 Justice Glaze also thought that the e-
mails were public records "because information is not exempt from the
FOIA unless specifically exempted under the Act or some other statute.
279
Justice Glaze stated that the circuit court properly favored public inter-
ests as required by the FOIA.28" He argued that remanding the case for an in
camera review was "unwarranted and a complete waste of time ... [that]
unnecessarily prolong[ed] the process and increase[d] the expense of a
court, which would not infringe on the employee's right to privacy." WATKINS & PELTZ,
supra note 30, at 437-38.
271. Pulaski County 1, 370 Ark. at 446, 260 S.W.3d at 724.
272. Id. at 446, 260 S.W.3d at 725-26.
273. Id. at 447, 260 S.W.3d at 726 (Glaze, J., dissenting).
274. Id., 260 S.W.3d at 726 (citing Laman v. McCord, 245 Ark. 401, 404-05, 432
S.W.2d 753, 755 (1968) (requiring that the FOIA be liberally interpreted in favor of the pub-
lic, yet stating that the FOIA requires little interpretation because its language and purpose
are clear)).
275. Id. at 448,260 S.W.3d at 727.
276. Id. at 449, 260 S.W.3d at 727.
277. Pulaski County I, 370 Ark. at 449, 260 S.W.3d at 727 (Glaze, J., dissenting).
278. ld. at 448, 260 S.W.3d at 727.
279. ld. at 449, 260 S.W.3d at 727 (citing Furman v. Holloway, 312 Ark. 378, 381, 849
S.W.2d 520, 522 (1993)).
280. Id. at 449, 260 S.W.3d at 728.
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FOIA request, and in so doing needlessly infringe[d] upon a citizen's right
to obtain public records. '2s In sum, Justice Glaze believed an in camera
review was improper because it unnecessarily impeded Arkansans' rightful
access to public records. 82
4. Justice Glaze's Second Dissent
Justice Glaze again parted with the majority's handling of the case in
Pulaski County H1.283 He stated that the purpose of the FOIA was to provide
the public with almost immediate access to public records and argued that
the court had done little to further that purpose.2 4 Furthermore, he accused
the majority of attempting to protect a public employee's inappropriate con-
duct by unjustifiably delaying access to Quillin's e-mails and preventing
public exposure of what was placed on a county computer during working
hours at the taxpayers' expense.85 Justice Glaze concluded that the court's
prolonged treatment of this case undermined the intent of the FOIA and
exclaimed: "Oh, the irony of it all!,
28
6
5. Justice Imber's Dissent
Justice Imber stated that the majority failed to apply traditional statuto-
ry construction rules in Pulaski County L.287 She also accused the majority of
failing to liberally interpret the FOIA.28s Justice Imber argued that all of the
e-mails at issue were presumed to be public records, and Pulaski County had
failed to rebut that presumption. 289
First, Justice Imber turned to rules of statutory construction and stated
"that the first rule in considering the meaning and effect of a statute [was] to
construe it just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually ac-
281. Id. at 449-50, 260 S.W.3d at 728.
282. Id. at 450, 260 S.W.3d 728.
283. Pulaski County II, 371 Ark. at 227, 264 S.W.3d at 472 (Glaze, J., dissenting). Justice
Glaze actually wrote three dissenting opinions throughout the course of this case, but for
purposes of this note only his dissents in Pulaski County I and Pulaski County II are dis-
cussed. His second dissent came on August 22, 2007, when the court denied the Arkansas
Democrat-Gazette's motion to lift the stay. Pulaski County v. Ark. Democrat-Gazette, Inc.,
370 Ark. 456, 457, 260 S.W.3d 299, 299 (2007) (Glaze, J., dissenting). He argued that the
stay should be lifted and that the county's desire to appeal a second time bordered on frivol-
ous. Id. at 457-58, 260 S.W.3d at 300.
284. Pulaski County II, 371 Ark. at 227, 264 S.W.3d at 472 (Glaze, J., dissenting).
285. Id. at 228, 264 S.W.3d at 473.
286. Id., 264 S.W.3d at 473.
287. Pulaski County 1, 370 Ark. at 450, 260 S.W.3d at 728 (Imber, J., dissenting).
288. Id., 260 S.W.3d at 728.
289. Id., 260 S.W.3d at 728.
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cepted meaning in common language. ' 290 Applying a plain language inter-
pretation to the definition of "public records," Justice Imber argued that the
emails retrieved by the Pulaski County computer hardware analyst were
records maintained by a public employee within the scope of his employ-
ment and should be presumed to be public records.29 Accordingly, she be-
lieved Pulaski County either had to overcome that presumption or disclose
all of the retrieved e-mails.292
Next, Justice Imber criticized Pulaski County's argument that the e-
mails were not public records because of their personal nature.293 She agreed
that the county's argument would be valid under a narrow definition of pub-
lic records.294 Nevertheless, she stated that the court has always liberally
interpreted the FOIA in favor of disclosure, and concluded that any e-mails
between a government employee and government contractor fell within a
liberal definition of public records.295 She asserted that "the very context of
the e-mails, Quillin and Jane Doe's relationship as business associates en-
gaged in a romantic relationship, [made] the content of the e-mails relevant
to ... the performance or lack of performance of a government official[,]"
and thereby satisfied the definition of public records.296
Finally, Justice Imber criticized the majority for analogizing this case
with cases involving FOIA exemptions where the trial courts ruled in favor
of the government. 2" Those cases required in camera reviews to prevent
government abuse of FOIA exemptions. 8 Justice Imber did not believe
remand for in camera review was needed in this case because the trial court
ruled in favor of the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, meaning in favor of the
public and in furtherance of the FOIA's policy of liberal disclosure. 9
6. Justice Danielson's Concurrence in Part, Dissent in Part
Justice Danielson wrote an opinion in Pulaski County II in which he
concurred in part and dissented in part." He concurred with the majority's
decision that the county and Jane Doe failed to demonstrate that the circuit
court's findings on remand were erroneous, but his concurrence stopped
290. Id., 260 S.W.3d at 728.
291. Id. at 451, 260 S.W.3d at 728.
292. Id., 260 S.W.3d at 728.
293. Pulaski County I, 370 Ark. at 451-52, 260 S.W.3d at 729 (Imber, J., dissenting).
294. Id. at 452, 260 S.W. 3d at 729.
295. Id., 260 S.W. 3d at 729.
296. Id. at 454, 260 S.W.3d at 731.
297. Id., 260 S.W.3d at 731.
298. Id., 260 S.W.3d at 731.
299. Pulaski County 1, 370 Ark. at 454, 260 S.W.3d at 731 (Imber, J., dissenting).
300. Pulaski County II, 371 Ark. at 222, 264 S.W.3d at 468-69 (Danielson, J., dissent-
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there.30' Justice Danielson asserted that the court mishandled this case from
the beginning and claimed that "the majority completely lost sight of and
ignored the [FOIA] statutory scheme and our case law."3 2
Justice Danielson accused the majority of completely disregarding the
rebuttable, statutory presumption and of erroneously remanding the case for
in camera review.303 He believed the e-mails were presumed to be public
records, a presumption that the county and Jane Doe could have rebutted by
proving that the e-mails did "not constitute a record of an employee's per-
formance or lack of performance of official functions.,, 304 He was convinced
that the trial court's original decision was correct, the county and Jane Doe
failed to rebut the presumption, and the majority gave the two parties an
unwarranted "second bite at the apple. 30 5
Although Justice Danielson dissented in Pulaski County II, he agreed
that the circuit court must review any document that the county argued was
not a record that constitutes a record of performance or lack of performance
of official functions.30 6 He expected, however, that the county would have
proffered the e-mails to the circuit court to create a record sufficient to show
error on appeal. 37 He stated that the majority mishandled the case because
the county and Jane Doe not only failed to rebut the public records presump-
tion but also failed to sufficiently develop a record by which a reviewing
court could determine whether the circuit court erred.30 ' Because of these
failures, Justice Danielson would have had the court affirm the circuit
court's original ruling reviewed in Pulaski County L
30
9
Justice Danielson stated that "[t]he sole consideration in determining
whether [a] record [was] a public record ...subject to disclosure [was]
whether [it] constitute[d] a record of the performance or lack of performance
of a public official," regardless of its nature as "personal, private, or sexual-
ly explicit."31 He argued that a court must liberally interpret the FOIA when
determining what constituted a "public record" to further the FOIA's "pur-
pose that public business be performed in an open and public manner." '' In
conclusion, Justice Danielson asserted that the majority's decision to re-
301. Id, 264 S.W.3d at 468-69.
302. Id., 264 S.W.3d at 469.
303. Id., 264 S.W.3d at 469.
304. Id. at 223, 264 S.W.3d 469.
305. Id., 264 S.W.3d 469.
306. Pulaski County 11, 371 Ark. at 224-25, 264 S.W.3d at 470. (Danielson, J., dissent-
ing).
307. Id. at 225 n.5, 264 S.W.3d at 470 n.5.
308. Id. at 227, 264 S.W.3d at 472.
309. Id.. at 223, 264 S.W.3d at 469.
310. Id. at 225, 264 S.W.3d at471.
311. Id. at 226, 264 S.W.3d at 471 (citing Ark. Dep't of Fin. & Admin. v. Pharmacy
Assocs., Inc., 333 Ark. 451, 456, 970 S.W.2d 217, 219 (1998)).
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mand the case resulted in an unnecessary delay contrary to the purposes and
objectives of the FOIA.312
IV. ANALYSIS
The Arkansas Supreme Court's decision in Pulaski County threatens to
"seriously weaken the FOIA and its legislative intent." '313 The majority uti-
lized its controversial "common sense" balancing approach to give effect to
the legislative intent concerning the disclosure of allegedly "personal" e-
mails,314 but it simultaneously disregarded the presumption that the Arkan-
sas General Assembly created in section 25-19-103(5)(A)." 5 By using its
"common sense" approach, the court made the argument that the rules of
statutory interpretation are unnecessary when legislative intent is clear on a
statute's face.316 This argument, however, is flawed considering that the
court interpreted the FOIA in favor of private interests rather than public
access, which is in contrast with the express legislative intent that Arkansans
have liberal access to public records.317 As Professor Watkins recognized,
"the attitude of agency officials toward the rights of the citizenry overwhel-
mingly determines whether the FOIA is to be a pathway or a roadblock.,
318
Unfortunately, it seems that the attitude of the Arkansas Supreme Court will
be the source of a FOIA roadblock in the future.
This section addresses the potential impact that Pulaski County will
have on Arkansans' statutory right to access public records. First, it focuses
on the increased costs of FOIA litigation caused by the requirement of in
camera review and the deterring effect it will have on e-mail requesters. 9
Next, it discusses the idea that Pulaski County embodies a judicially-created
"personal" exception to the FOIA. 320 Finally, it considers the increased dis-
cretion that the court's content-based analysis gives to state trial judges and
how this threatens the future of open government in Arkansas.32 1
312. Pulaski County II, 371 Ark. at 227, 264 S.W.3d at 472 (Danielson, J., dissenting).
313. Pulaski County 1, 370 Ark. 435, 447, 260 S.W.3d 718, 726 (2007) (Glaze, J., dis-
senting).
314. Id., 370 Ark. at 440, 260 S.W.3d at 721.
315. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-103(5)(A) (LEXIS Repl. 2002 & Supp. 2007).
316. WATKINS & PELTZ, supra note 30, at 12.
317. See Pulaski County I, 370 Ark. at 444, 260 S.W.3d at 724 (stating that in camera
review was necessary to protect personal records).
318. Watkins, supra note 39, at 842.
319. See infra Part IV.A
320. See infra Part IV.B.
321. See infra Part IV.C.
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A. Increased Costs of FOIA Litigation
The court's decision in Pulaski County effectively hampers Arkansans'
ability to access public records by immediately increasing the cost of FOIA
litigation. By burdening state trial courts with the review of a potentially
voluminous number of e-mail records, e-mail requesters will be discouraged
from pursuing FOIA litigation because of the great expense associated with
such a task. Also, by giving trial judges more discretion to determine what
constitutes a public record, the potential for appeal is greatly increased. Fur-
ther, in camera review necessarily requires the e-mail requester to file suit.
After Pulaski County, an e-mail requester knows that the costs of its re-
quests will be substantially increased because of the burden the trial court
will face in reviewing a potentially voluminous amount of e-mails and the
increased possibility of appellate proceedings. 2' These reasons alone are
enough to deter e-mail requesters from filing suit, which is a detriment to
the system that the Arkansas General Assembly did not intend when it
enacted the FOIA.
The ability of citizens to access public records and to scrutinize the
management of their state and local governments is arguably the "most ef-
fective check that citizens have on their elected officials. 323 This right pro-
motes accountability of government officials and agencies, fosters public
trust and confidence by opening government operations to the public eye,
and encourages participation in the democratic process."2 To further these
noble goals, however, citizens must be willing and able to request public
records, combat any reluctance to disclosure, and publicly report their find-
ings. If, however, the costs of making a FOIA request become too much for
less-than-deep-pocketed requesters to bear, many requesters will be deterred
from making FOIA requests in the first place.
Knowing that the costs of FOIA requests have increased, government
bodies fueled by their "self-protective instincts of the governmental bureau-
cracy ''325 will be encouraged to deny more FOIA requests on the basis that a
requested document is an allegedly "personal" record. In doing so, the go-
vernmental bodies recognize that the uphill battle for a FOIA requester has
become more difficult, thereby increasing the government's chance of suc-
cessfully withholding the requested records. Furthermore, regardless of
whether the judge decides that the e-mails are public records, an appeal is
most likely in order. Again, the requester faces the high costs of an appeal
322. See Pulaski County I, 370 Ark. at 449-50, 260 S.W.3d at 728 (2007) (Glaze, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that in camera review increases the costs of FOIA requests).
323. Halstuk & Davis, supra note 3, at 984.
324. Kozinets, supra note 97, at 17.




and will likely abandon his or her request, resulting in another win for the
withholding government body.
The decrease in FOIA litigation and the prolonged process associated
with in camera review will be detrimental to the FOIA's purpose. A de-
crease in the number of successful requests will undoubtedly lead to less
transparency in government, and much more government business will go
unchecked by the public. Also, the amount of time associated with in cam-
era review and the increased likelihood of appeal will delay a timely disclo-
sure of critical public records. From any point of view, it appears the re-
quirement of in camera review seriously threatens the success of FOIA re-
quests for e-mail records, which is a disturbing result considering the in-
creased use of e-mail correspondence in the daily conduct of governmental
affairs. To put it in perspective, an electronic evidence expert estimated that
a business with 100 employees could generate 7,500,000 e-mail messages
326per year. 6 The state of Arkansas, not including county and local govern-
ments, employs over 50,000 people.3 27 Following the expert's same calcula-
tion method, this means that the employees of the state of Arkansas could
produce well over 3.75 billion e-mail records per year.
In camera review is probably unavoidable in many situations because
the "performance" language in the first sentence of section 25-19-103(5)(A)
of the Arkansas Code is determinative of what documents constitute "public
records.'32 ' Nevertheless, an alternative to in camera review is necessary to
decrease the costs of e-mail requests because, if high-cost deterrence is not
minimized, then the purpose of the FOIA will be seriously and permanently
undermined.
Arkansas courts and the Arkansas General Assembly should establish a
standard focused on a strong presumption in favor of e-mail disclosure.329
326. Kenneth J. Withers, Discovery of Electronic Evidence: What You Need to Know,
May 29, 2003, http://www.kenwithers.com/articles/abcny/slide09.html. This number was
calculated by predicting that an employee of the business will generate twenty-five e-mails
per day for 250 working days per year, for a total of 625,000 e-mails. Id. It also assumed a
business will conduct twelve monthly backups, which brings the total to 7,500,000. Id.
327. Aaron Sadler, State Employee Numbers Increase, Ark. News Bureau, Jan. 19, 2006,
http://www.arkansasnews.com/archive/2006/01/19/News/333086.html.
328. See Op. Ark. Att'y Gen. No. 2005-095 (2005) (opining that documents must satisfy
the first sentence of the section).
329. Kozinets, supra note 97, at 23. Arguably, the Arkansas General Assembly did just
that by enacting the last sentence of section 25-19-103(5)(A) of the Arkansas Code, but as
made apparent in Pulaski County, the Arkansas Supreme Court did not think the general
assembly's efforts were enough to require anything less than in camera review. See Pulaski
County I, 370 Ark. 435, 446, 260 S.W.3d 718, 725-26 (2007). In Pulaski County, the county
did little more than say that the documents were not public records, which was sufficient in
the supreme court's eyes to warrant remand for in camera review. Id. at 438-39, 446, 260
S.W.3d at 726. Had the supreme court applied a more strenuous presumption of public
records status as Judge McGowan had done, the county would have had to argue that the e-
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Furthermore, when in camera review is required, the courts should look at
both the content and context of the e-mails.33° It would defeat the purpose of
the FOIA if "personal" language alone could be used to hide improper or
illegal conduct that clearly falls within the purview of the public's interest.
By implementing a strong presumption in favor of public record status and
requiring both context- and content-based analysis, the deterrent factor made
effective by Pulaski County will be reduced because it will: (1) limit the
number of e-mails that would have to be reviewed in camera by requiring
litigants opposing disclosure to specifically focus their objections on the e-
mails they believe are purely personal, thereby lowering costs to request-
ers;31' (2) increase the potential for a successful FOIA request by restoring
the traditional standard in favor of disclosure; 332 and (3) prevent government
abuse in denying FOIA request on personal grounds without a well-
grounded argument for doing SO.
333
B. Personal Exception
Although the majority in Pulaski County based its holding on the inter-
pretation of the "performance" language found in section 25-19-
103(5)(A),3 one gets the feeling that the majority's decision was driven by
a desire to protect employee privacy in e-mails generated on county-owned
computers. 331 This ulterior motive, if true, is inconsistent with precedent and
the court's long history of construing the FOIA liberally.336 As previously
stated, one of the primary goals of the FOIA is to allow the citizenry to
monitor the conduct of their elected officials, to check their elected officials'
decisions, and to prevent abuses of power.337 Essentially, the FOIA opens
the activities of the government to public scrutiny, but the public can only
exercise its power over state and local government officials if the public can
inspect the records generated by these persons.338
mails were more than merely "personal." At a minimum, the records should have been pre-
sumed to be public records first and personal records second, a result that is clearly consistent
with the Arkansas General Assembly's intent when it created the statutory presumption of
public record status. See ARK. CODE. ANN. § 25-19-103(5)(A) (LEXIS Supp. 2007).




334. Pulaski County 1, 370 Ark. at 440-41, 260 S.W.3d at 721-22.
335. Kozinets, supra note 97, at 23.
336. See Laman v. McCord, 245 Ark. 401, 432 Ark. S.W.2d 753 (1968).
337. Kozinets, supra note 97, at 17-18.
338. Penelope Thurmon Bryan & Thomas E. Reynolds, Agency E-mails and the Public




Many scholars and courts have recognized that the increased use of e-
mails by government officials and employees will lead to FOIA abuse,
whether intentional or not.339 Therefore, it seems reasonable that by antic-
ipating this problem, courts hearing FOIA litigation would have addressed
this issue before it became a problem of great public concern. Nevertheless,
this has not been the case, and courts have seemingly erased decades of case
law that required liberal interpretation of public records laws in favor of
public access.' These courts, including the Arkansas Supreme Court, have
essentially created a "personal" exception to the FOIA and related public
records laws.3"'
Courts have historically refused to allow state agencies to withhold
records by raising content-based objections not grounded in statutorily-
created exceptions because doing so "would effectively divest the
[l]egislature of its status as the only government branch authorized to dec-
lare a record exempt from public inspection. 342 In Arkansas, the supreme
court has stated that the policy decisions required in developing exceptions
to the FOIA "are peculiarly within the province of the legislative branch of
the government. 3 43 Although the Arkansas Supreme Court has traditionally
construed the FOIA liberally in favor of disclosure and in furtherance of
legislative intent,344 it seems to reverse course in Pulaski County, creating an
exception to the FOIA that restricts Arkansans' ability to access public
records by disregarding the statutory presumption of public record status
created by the Arkansas General Assembly when it enacted section 25-19-
103(5)(A) of the Arkansas Code. 45
As conceded above,346 the "performance" language in the first sentence
of section 25-19-103(5)(A) of the Arkansas Code drives the definition of
"public records., 347 Nevertheless, the last sentence of that section, which
creates the presumption of public record status, 8 cannot be deemed super-
fluous; it was enacted for a reason. The reason may have been to prevent the
government from raising content-based, non-statutory objections to the dis-
closure of public records. In Pulaski County, the county rejected disclosure
339. Jean Maneke & Dan Curry, Public Scrutiny of Missouri E-mail Under the Sunshine
Law, 60 J. Mo. B. 14, 14-15 (2004).
340. See supra Part II.D.
341. Kozinets, supra note 97, at 17.
342. Bryan & Reynolds, supra note 338, at 659.
343. Laman v. McCord, 245 Ark. 401,406, 432 S.W.2d 753, 756 (1968).
344. Id. at 404-05, 432 S.W.2d at 755.
345. ARK. CODE. ANN. § 25-19-103(5)(A) (LEXIS Supp. 2007).
346. See supra Part [V.A.
347. See ARK. CODE. ANN. § 25-19-103(5)(A) (LEXIS Supp. 2007).
348. Id. ("All records maintained in public offices or by public employees within the
scope of their employment shall be presumed to be public records.").
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on the basis that the e-mails were allegedly "personal," 9 an objection not
based on one of the many FOIA exceptions enacted by the Arkansas Gener-
al Assembly.350 By disregarding the public record presumption found in sec-
tion 25-19-103(5)(A) of the Arkansas Code and allowing Pulaski County's
non-statutory objection to prevail, 35' the Arkansas Supreme Court essentially
established a "personal" exception to the FOIA that is unsupported by the
FOIA's statutory scheme.
In fact, the FOIA's statutory scheme and decades of judicial interpreta-
tion of the FOIA suggest an approach that furthers the public's interest in
access to governmental affairs rather than restricting this public right in fa-
vor of privacy interests, as was the case in Pulaski County. The "perfor-
mance" language of the FOIA extends to records that are in fact public but
are held in a private setting, such as an e-mail that conducts public business
through a personal e-mail account.352 Furthermore, the last sentence of sec-
tion 25-19-103(5)(A) presumes that a record maintained in a public office
by an employee in the course of his employment is a public record subject to
disclosure.353 The presumption is rebuttable, but the document is initially
deemed a public record, and the burden is on the party opposing disclosure
to rebut that presumption.3 ' Both the Arkansas Supreme Court's reasoning
in Scott v. Smith355 and the Arkansas General Assembly's public record pre-
sumption balance the public and private interests involved and resolve any
discrepancy in favor of the public benefit. In clear conflict with the prin-
ciple that the FOIA was "passed wholly in the public interest,' '316 the "per-
sonal" exception created in Pulaski County relieves the party opposing dis-
closure of their burden to overcome the statutory presumption, ignores legis-
lative intent, and undermines the idea of liberal public access to governmen-
tal records.
The argument that Pulaski County creates a "personal" exception to the
FOIA is strengthened because the Arkansas Supreme Court now requires a
trial court to review the requested e-mails to determine whether they are
349. Pulaski County 1, 370 Ark. at 438-39, 260 S.W.3d at 720.
350. ARK. CODE. ANN. § 25-19-105(b) (LEXIS Supp. 2007).
351. Pulaski County 1, 370 Ark. at 446, 260 S.W.3d at 725 ("[E]ven with the statutory
presumption, it is still necessary to examine... [these] e-mails... to discern whether [they]
relate solely to personal matters").
352. See, e.g., Scott v. Smith, 292 Ark. 174, 175, 728 S.W.2d 515, 515 (1987) (rejecting
physical possession by agency counsel as determinative of document's status as a public
record).
353. ARK. CODE. ANN. § 25-19-103(5)(A) (LEXIS Supp. 2007).
354. Op. Ark. Att'y Gen. No. 2005-095 (2005) (stating the agency will bear the burden of
overcoming the presumption).
355. Scott, 292 Ark. at 175, 728 S.W.2d at 515.
356. Laman, 245 Ark. at 405,432 S.W.2d at 755.
20091
UALR LAW REVIEW
even "public records" under the FOIA.357 In Arizona, this is a reasonable
result because in that state there is only a presumption that all public records
are subject to disclosure,358 but such review is unnecessary in Arkansas. In
Arizona, statutes do not explicitly define the term "public records," and the
Arizona courts have developed the definition of the term through case
law.359 This requires that Arizona state courts determine whether a document
is even a public record before ruling on disclosure; therefore, the burden is
on the courts to determine this status.3 °
In contrast, the Arkansas General Assembly explicitly defined "public
records, '36' created a presumption of public record status to facilitate disclo-
36236sure, and subjected all non-exempted "public records" to disclosure.363 By
creating the "personal" exception, the Arkansas Supreme Court disregards
the statutory presumption, effectively equating a public record in Arkansas
with that which is a public record in Arizona. The supreme court placed the
burden on Arkansas trial judges to decide whether a document is a public
record,36 even though the legislature clearly placed the burden on the parties
opposing disclosure to prove that a requested record presumed to be public
is not actually a public record subject to disclosure.365
As the majority points out in Pulaski County, courts must review doc-
uments in camera when a government agency or other opposing party
claims a legislatively-created, statutory exception as grounds for withhold-
ing documents.366 The purpose for requiring in camera review in cases in-
volving FOIA exceptions is rooted in the idea that the general assembly
enacted the FOIA in the public interest, reflecting a public policy of open
government-the same policy furthered by the requirement that exceptions
be interpreted narrowly in favor of disclosure.367 In FOIA exception cases, in
camera review prevents governmental abuse of the FOIA by protecting the
strong public interest in the transparency of government operations.368 The
357. Pulaski County 1, 370 Ark. at 446, 260 S.W.3d at 726.
358. Griffis v. Pinal County, 156 P.3d 418, 421 (Ariz. 2007).
359. Id.
360. Id. at 422.
361. ARK. CODE. ANN. § 25-19-103(5)(A) (LEXIS Supp. 2007).
362. Id.
363. Id. § 25-19-105(a)(1) (LEXIS Supp. 2007).
364. See Pulaski County 1, 370 Ark. at 444, 260 S.W.3d at 724 (stating that a neutral
court should decide whether a document is or is not a public record).
365. Op. Ark. Att'y Gen. No. 2005-095 (2005) (stating the agency will bear the burden of
overcoming the presumption).
366. Pulaski County 1, 370 Ark. at 443-44, 260 S.W.3d at 724 (citing Johninson v. Stodo-
la, 316 Ark. 423, 427, 872 S.W.2d 374, 376 (1994); Gannett River States Publ'g Co. v. Ar-
kansas Indus. Dev. Comm'n, 303 Ark. 684, 689-90, 799 S.W.2d 543, 547 (1990)).
367. McCambridge v. City of Little Rock, 298 Ark. 219, 226, 766 S.W.2d 909, 912
(1989).
368. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-102 (LEXIS Repl. 2002).
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procedure is designed "to ensure that the government agency has fulfilled its
affirmative duty of proving that the records are truly exempt from disclo-
sure." 369 Unfortunately, by using the same tool designed to protect the public
interest in disclosure of public records, the supreme court in Pulaski County
created a "personal" exception to the FOIA that is adverse to the FOIA's
laudable purposes.
The "personal" exception may also have the effect of encouraging fur-
ther misconduct by public officials or employees, especially if such persons
believe that they can freely communicate using government-owned e-mail
systems with the immunity of a judicially-created FOIA exception. 370 It is
clear that the public's ability to monitor official functions and inspect public
records is an effective deterrent of official misconduct, such as the misap-
propriation of government funds.371 If, however, a government agency can
withhold what appears on its face to be a personal e-mail sent or received on
a government computer, unscrupulous officials and government employees
will be protected from public scrutiny. In fact, such officials and employees
could conduct their illegal or inappropriate behavior in the disguise of per-
sonal communication and be protected by the same law designed to bring
just that kind of behavior to the forefront of public concern. Again, such a
results flies in the face of legislative intent and threatens the future of open
government in the state of Arkansas.
C. Increased Discretion for State Trial Judges
An issue closely related to the "personal" exception is the amount of
discretion that Pulaski County provides Arkansas state trial judges. The dis-
cretion is rooted in the weak and ambiguous "connection to the performance
of official functions" standard that judges must use to determine if an alle-
gedly personal record is actually a public record subject to disclosure.372 By
failing to clearly articulate the intricacies and limits of this standard, the
supreme court has allowed subjectivity to replace objectivity in the determi-
nation of what constitutes a "public record" subject to disclosure.
At first blush, the "connection to the performance of official functions"
standard seems reasonable and easily applicable. But upon closer inspection,
the standard provides a significant amount of discretion to judges reviewing
allegedly "personal" e-mails. The supreme court's failure to elaborate on
369. Pulaski County I, 370 Ark. at 454, 260 S.W.3d at 731 (Imber, J., dissenting).
370. Bryan & Reynolds, supra note 338, at 666.
371. Id. at 664.
372. Pulaski County I, 370 Ark. at 446, 260 S.W.3d at 725. The standard's name is a
creation of this note's author, but it derives from the court's ambiguous standard, namely that




what constitutes a sufficient "connection to the performance of official func-
tions" will result in an inconsistent application of the standard throughout
the state because it is unclear what distinguishes a "personal" record from
one that "reflect[s] a substantial nexus with [government] activities. 373 By
providing this discretion, the likelihood of successfully litigating a FOIA
case will be less predictable, resulting in the same chilling effect as the in-
creased litigation costs discussed above. 374 A potential requester faced with
the high costs of litigation will be further discouraged from making a FOIA
request knowing that a judge will decide the fate of his or her request behind
closed doors and away from the public eye.
The Arkansas Supreme Court's "connection to the performance of offi-
cial functions" standard "threatens to shield from disclosure e-mails that do
not necessarily memorialize the performance of required government func-
tion but that could nevertheless reveal official malfeasance, misfeasance, or
nonfeasance." '375 This is because of the difficulty in distinguishing that
which is purely "personal" from that which is purely "official," and such
difficulty is compounded at the margins of these categories.
On its face, an e-mail may seem to relate to a personal relationship be-
tween government employees. Nevertheless, such an e-mail could show
favoritism, corruption, fraternization in violation of government policy, sex-
ual discrimination or harassment, or any other kind of conduct that could
result in discipline or termination.3 76 Although such e-mails may not reflect
the performance of official duties or functions, they are important to the
public who places special trust in the government officials who are exchang-
ing such e-mails or supervising those who are.
Similarly, an e-mail exchanged between a government official and a
private party may not reflect the performance of government functions.377
Such an e-mail, however, may provide evidence into the illegal trading of
favors between a government official and the private party.378 For example,
an e-mail about a public official's weekend fishing trip seems harmless until
someone discovers that the trip was paid for by parties conducting business
before that official's agency.
But who makes the decision as to whether an e-mail has a substantial
connection to government business? According to Pulaski County, a single
trial judge is to decide, by reviewing an e-mail in camera, whether the e-
mail sufficiently reflects the performance of official functions. 379 The re-
373. Id., 260 S.W.3d at 725.
374. See supra Part IV.A.




379. Pulaski County I, 370 Ark. at 446, 260 S.W.3d at 726.
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quirement for in camera review threatens the public's right of access by
placing too much discretion in the hands of state trial judges.
The increased discretion given to state trial judges provides an oppor-
tunity for both judicial abuse and judicial mistake in interpreting and apply-
ing the FOIA. The abuse will result from anti-FOIA judges' narrow inter-
pretation of the "connection to the performance of official functions" stan-
dard. These anti-FOIA judges will limit the scope of what documents they
believe demonstrate the performance of official functions. By limiting what
constitutes a public record, these judges will decrease the number of suc-
cessful FOIA requests, effectively undermining the principal of liberal dis-
closure historically required by the FOIA and the Arkansas Supreme
Court.380
Some judges may be accused of possessing anti-FOIA views because
they will inadvertently interpret the "connection to the performance of offi-
cial functions" standard narrowly and improperly deny the disclosure of
requested e-mails. These judges will simply misapply the standard due to
the supreme court's failure to articulate clear, manageable standards. Al-
though the supreme court suggested that it intends to continue interpreting
the FOIA in favor of disclosure,38' its failure to create a standard that favors
disclosure, or at least facilitates it, seems to undermine the court's assertion.
Because of the failure to articulate clear standards, a trial judge could
easily confuse the court's analysis (or lack thereof) with the United States
Supreme Court's controversial "central purpose" test.382 If Arkansas trial
judges confuse the two, the result will critically impair the ability of Arkan-
sans to receive information about their state and local governments and will
forever distort the FOIA and its purpose.
In United States Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for
Freedom of the Press,383 a CBS reporter sought to obtain an FBI rap sheet on
Charles Medico for the reporter's investigation into the relationship between
a corrupt Pennsylvania congressman and a known crime-family member
whose business received federal defense contracts.3 4 When the FBI refused
the request, the reporter filed suit.385 After an eleven-year court battle, the
Court held that the public interest must be balanced against the privacy in-
380. Laman, 245 Ark. at 402, 432 Ark. S.W.2d at 754.
381. Pulaski County 1, 370 Ark. at 439, 260 S.W.3d at 721.
382. The "central purpose" test was developed in United States Department of Justice v.
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749 (1989), and limited public
records subject to disclosure under the federal FOIA to only those documents that directly
reveal the operations or activities of the federal government. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at
772-73.
383. 489 U.S. 749 (1989).




terests involved when determining what documents are subject to disclo-
sure. 386 It concluded that only official information directly revealing the op-
erations or activities of the federal government should be disclosed because
the federal FOIA focused on United States citizens' right "to know what
their government is up to." '387 Believing that "the FOIA's central purpose
[was] to ensure that the Government's activities be opened to the sharp eye
of public scrutiny, not that information about private citizens that hap-
pen[ed] to be in the warehouse of the Government be so disclosed, 388 the
Court denied disclosure of the rap sheet.389 As a result of this decision, the
definition of a record subject to disclosure under the federal FOIA was in-
terpreted to include only official information that reflected an agency's per-
formance and conduct of its statutory duties.39 °
The Reporters Committee "central purpose" test is considered "an
alarming instance of judicial activism.., that constrict[s] the ambit of the
FOIA's statutory purpose., 391 The result of the "central purpose" test greatly
restricted the number and kinds of records subject to disclosure under the
federal FOIA because it only allowed access to those records that directly
reflected an agency's performance of government operations.392 It raised
legitimate concerns about public access to an enormous amount of informa-
tion that did not necessarily reveal the performance of government business,
but which nevertheless had substantial value to the public.393 The concerns
became a reality as lower federal courts began to reformulate their FOIA
precedent in favor of privacy interests and against public disclosure.394
The Supreme Court's "central purpose" test and the Arkansas Supreme
Court's "connection to the performance of official functions" standard are
strikingly similar, posing a realistic threat to the future of the Arkansas
FOIA. If Arkansas courts adopt the "central purpose" test, the courts will
closely scrutinize public interest assertions, and Arkansans will see their
successful FOIA requests diminished in favor of privacy interests. As the
386. Id. at 772-73.
387. Id.
388. Id. at 774.
389. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S at 774.
390. Id. at 773.
391. Halstuk & Davis, supra note 3, at 995.
392. Halstuk & Davis, supra note 3, at 992. This standard is analogous to the "connection
to the performance of official functions" standard developed by the Arkansas Supreme Court
in Pulaski County. See Pulaski County 1, 370 Ark. 435, 446, 260 S.W.3d 718, 725 (2007)
(requiring that e-mails reflect a close connection to the performance of government activities
before being subject to disclosure).
393. Halstuk & Davis, supra note 3, at 990.
394. Halstuk & Davis, supra note 3, at 996 (providing an extensive list of federal courts
that reconsidered the privacy concerns implicated in FOIA cases) (citations omitted).
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above examples show,395 many e-mails do not directly reveal agency per-
formance, but have the potential to shed light on official decision making,
management, and misconduct. The "central purpose" test will prevent access
to these e-mail records-a result that undermines the mandate of the Arkan-




Pulaski County is a direct threat to Arkansans' statutory right to inspect
the e-mail records produced by the officials and employees of their state and
local governments. The Arkansas Supreme Court's failure to elaborate on its
newly created "connection to the performance of official functions" standard
results in a lack of guidance for the state's trial courts and increases the pos-
sibility of government abuse in denying FOIA requests. Though the long-
term effect of Pulaski County is unclear, its potential impact threatens to
forever undermine the purpose of the FOIA. To prevent such stark results,
the Arkansas General Assembly and Arkansas state courts should revive the
statutory presumption in favor of public record status, demand clarification
of the "connection to the performance of official functions" standard, and
adopt policies that will minimize the privacy interests involved in e-mails
created on government computers. In sum, the guarantee of public access to
government records must be preserved to ensure Arkansans' ability to moni-
tor the operations of their state and local governments, to scrutinize their
elected officials, and to stay actively involved in the democratic process of
this great state.
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